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ABSTRACT
Three groups of ten professional psychologists were 
provided with differing types of information about an actual 
counseling client: one group received minimal, or stereotype,
information about the client (Stereotype Group); a second 
group received minimal information and viewed videotaped 
excerpts from a counseling session with the client (Stereo­
type-Video Groupé; and a third received both of these types 
of information plus test protocols from a standard test 
battery administered to the client (Stereotype-Video-Diag- 
nostics Group). All subjects then made a number of clinical 
judgments about the client. These included: 1) predicting
how the client described herself on a personality checklist 
(Predictive Task), 2) evaluating the client on a number of 
clinical dimensions (Evaluative Task), and 3) diagnosis of 
the client. Judges were also asked to rate their confidence 
in the accuracy of each judgment made.
No significant effect of type of information upon accur­
acy in performance of either the Predictive or Evaluative 
Tasks was obtained. Type of information did appear to have 
an effect upon diagnosis of the client and upon confidence 
in judgments. Type of information was found to have a sig­
nificant effect upon the extent to which judges relied upon 
assumed similarity in predicting how the client saw herself.
V
Effects of Information
It was concluded that type of information may have com­
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Effects of Differing Types of Information 
Upon Clinical Judgments
The manner in which different kinds of information about 
a client affect the clinician’s judgment about that client is 
an issue of importance in the field of psychodiagnostic test­
ing and psychotherapy. The rationale for administration of 
psychological tests would appear to be that testing provides 
additional information with which to increase understanding 
of the client in one or both of two important ways: first,
from an "external" perspective in terms of the actual per­
sonality dynamics of the client as it has import for making 
clinical judgments (e.g., therapy approach, hospitalization, 
court-related issues, and others), and, secondly, from an 
"internal" reference point in terms of understanding the 
client's self-perceptions. This latter type of understanding 
may relate to the process of "empathy" in therapy which 
Rogers (1957) and Carkhuff (1967), among others, have en­
visioned as important to positive process change.
On the other hand, some therapists question the value 
of psychological testing, objecting that, far from aiding 
in understanding the client, diagnostic material impedes 
understanding through the creation of response sets, re­
sulting in stereotyping or pigeon-holing of clients.
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Previous research examining the effect of different 
types or amounts of information, such as diagnostic test 
material, upon the ability of judges to make accurate judg­
ments about a subject has yielded equivocal results (Hamlin, 
1954; Borke and Fiske, 1957; Giedt, 1955 ; Soskin, 1954a, 
1954b, 1959; Kostlan, 1954; Horowitz, 1962, Stelmachers and 
McHugh, 1964; Hjelle, 1968; Taft, 1966; Rodin, 1975; Cline, 
1955; Cline and Richards, 1958; and Cline and Richards,
1960). Studies have sometimes found predictions based on 
minimal or "stereotype" information to be as accurate as, or 
more accurate than, judgments based on more complex data, 
such as test material. The information provided to judges 
in many of these studies has, however, been of questionable 
value to the judgments required. The judgment tasks them­
selves have typically not been relevant to the judgments 
actually required of the practicing clinician. In most 
cases, judges have been asked to make predictions based upon 
descriptive or diagnostic material without ever having seen 
the individual whom they were judging. Shrauger and Al-v 
trocchi (1964) pointed out that selection effects may occur 
in studies in which the person judged is not actually ob­
served by the judges,
Rodin (1975) also speculated that failure of a number 
of earlier studies to find increased predictive accuracy as
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a function of increased information may have been due to the 
lack of relevance of information given judges to the judgments 
required of them. She found that when judges were allowed to 
self-select information they deemed useful in making given 
judgments, they were able to predict with greater accuracy 
than a "stereotype” group. However, judgment tasks which she 
employed seem of questionable relevance to those required in 
clinical settings.
Few generalizations relating to the effects of differing 
types of information upon predictive accuracy can be made 
from the findings reviewed above. The differences among 
studies in judgments required and other experimental pro­
cedures employed were rarely systematic and make direct com­
parison of results extremely difficult. However, one rela­
tively consistent finding seems to be that certain types of 
information, such as diagnostic labels or projective test 
data, can result in response biases in perceptions of the 
client. Another finding which seems to recur is that pre­
dictive accuracy can be about as good, or sometimes better, 
when responses are based upon minimal or "stereotype" infor­
mation as when based upon more complex information, such 
as test data.
The current study examines again the effect of differing 
kinds of information upon accuracy of clinical judgments. An
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attempt has been made to employ experimental procedures which 
more closely approximate the conditions routinely existing 
in clinical practice both through inclusion of diagnostic 
test material and observation of an actual counseling session 
with a client.
As noted by Reed and Jackson (1975), since the mid 
nineteen-sixties, researchers have focused upon the develop­
ment of descriptive models of information processing, rather 
than upon the accuracy of judgments. Many studies have been 
concerned with the application of probability notions, or 
Bayesian theory, to judgment processes. Reviews of this area 
were made by Peterson and Beach (1967) and Slovic and Lich­
tenstein (1971). Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) cite these re­
views as support for their view that "Bayes’ theorem is a 
reasonably good descriptive model of human information pro­
cessing" (p. 184).
On the other hand, Kahneraan and Tversky (1973), found 
that judges in their studies did not act in accord with 
normative, or Bayesian theory, as they relied too much on 
individuating information and paid little attention to 
"base rates" or prior probability. The findings of Kahneman 
and Tversky (1973) were supported by Lyon and Slovic (1976); 
Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall and Reed (1976); and Slovic, 
Fischoff, and Lichtenstein (1977).
Effects of Information
5
Rosenhan's 1973 study of psychiatric diagnostic judgment 
called that process into serious question and precipitated 
much discussion and analysis (Crown, 1975; Farber, 1975;
Milion, 1975 ; Rosenhan, 1975; Spitzer, 1975 ; Weiner, 1975) 
and Davis (1976; 1979) discussed the role of base rate appli­
cation in psychodiagnosis and concluded that the misdiagnoses 
made by clinicians in the Rosenhan (1973) study were attrib­
utable to their failure to consider appropriate base rate 
data. In a review of the literature on stereotyping, Mc­
Cauley, Stitt, and Segal (.1980) conclude, " . . .  people 
sometimes underuse data and rely too much on base rate, 
sometimes underuse base rate and rely too much on individu­
ating information, and sometimes attend to both according 
to the Bayesian prescription" (p. 200).
In a series of studies (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972;
1973; and Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) Kahneman and Tversky 
found that their judges did not perform in a Bayesian manner 
when making predictive versus evaluative judgments. Although 
tasks of a predictive nature require greater extrapolation 
from the data than do tasks of an evaluative nature, judg­
ments were found to be equally extreme when subjects were 
asked to predict a remote objective criterion on the basis 
of sketchy information as when they were asked merely to 
evaluate the information itself. Kahneman and Tversky
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explain their findings on the basis of the "representative­
ness heuristic." That is, judges will make that prediction 
which seems to be "representative" of the data no matter how 
incomplete the information or how irrelevant the information 
may be as a basis for prediction.
In practice, clinicians are frequently called upon not 
only to evaluate a client (or make a comparison on some di­
mensions with a reference group), but also to make some pre­
diction about performance. Such judgments may be risky not 
only in that they involve very large inferences on the basis 
of insufficient or perhaps irrelevant data, but such pre­
dictions may also involve great risk in terms of practical 
consequences to the individual involved (e.g., how likely 
is a client to commit a violent crime, etc.).
The current study will examine the manner in which 
differing types of information affect judgments of a pre­
dictive and of an evaluative nature made in a clinical 
context. These tasks will be described in detail in the 
discussion of experimental procedure.
Finally, the relationship between confidence in a 
judgment and the kind of information upon which the clinician 
bases that judgment will be examined. Little (1961) found 
evidence for the existence of a stable "level of general 
confidence" which is characteristic of individuals.
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Oskarap (1965) investigated the relationship between amount 
of information and confidence in judgments, and found that 
as amount of information increased, confidence increased 
dramatically while accuracy of judgments did not increase 
significantly. Judgments were, however, made only on the 
basis of case-summary material, without the judges ever 
having viewed the subject of their judgments. The present 
study will allow for viewing, in a clinical context, the 
client to be judged.
Several hypotheses related to effect of differing types 
of information upon predictive and evaluative judgments and 
confidence in those judgments were formulated. First, it was 
hypothesized that allowing for viewing of the client in an 
actual counseling session would make available highly rele­
vant client-related cues. This might result in improvement 
in predictive accuracy for the Stereotype-Video and Stereo- 
type-Video-Diagnostics Information Groups as compared to 
the Stereotype Information Group,, who did not view the 
client.
It was further hypothesized that diagnostic material 
might result in a set to "objectively evaluate" a client 
rather than an attempt to see the client as she saw herself. 
"Objective" evaluation of the client was required in the 
evaluative task while understanding of the clients' self­
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perception was necessary in the predictive task. For the 
evaluative task, then, the Stereotype-Video-Diagnostics 
Information Group was expected to achieve greatest accuracy, 
followed by the Stereotype-Video Information Group, with the 
Stereotype Information Group least accurate.
Conversely, it was hypothesized that for the predictive 
task, the Stereotype-Video Information Group would achieve 
the greatest predictive accuracy, followed by the Stereo- 
type-Video-Diagnostics Information Group, with the Stereo­
type Information Group again being least accurate.
Finally, as confidence has previously been shown to 
increase with increased information, it was hypothesized 
that the Stereotype-Video-Diagnostics Group would be most 
confident in their judgments, as they possessed the most 
information about the client, followed by the Stereotype- 





The subjects were 30 professional counselor/therapists 
with experience in individual therapy and diagnostic testing. 
Included were 18 males and 12 females. Demographic informa­
tion concerning subjects is summarized in Table 1. Subjects 
were randomly assigned in equal numbers to three experimental 
conditions, as follows.
Experimental Conditions and Procedure
Stereotype condition. Those subjects in the Stereotype 
Condition were given minimal information about an actual 
client including sex (female), age (21), college major 
(computer science), and the fact that she was a counseling/ 
psychotherapy client at a university counseling center.
Stereotype - Video condition. Subjects in this condi­
tion received the, minimal information about the same client 
and also viewed a 15-minute videotape of segments taken from 
a counseling session with the client. The tape was composed 
of three five-minute segments taken at random from the 
beginning, middle, and end of the client's first session 
with her counselor after interview with an intake worker.
Stereotype-Video-Diagnostics condition. Subjects in
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this group received the minimal information about the client, 
viewed the videotape, and additionally were provided with 
diagnostic material about the client. Viewing of the video­
tape and study of the diagnostic material were counterbal­
anced for order of presentation. Diagnostic data was pre­
sented in protocol form in order to approximate actual 
clinical conditions. For the Rorschach Inkblot Test, a 
summary table was also provided. The battery was composed 
of: 1) Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), 1) Ror­
schach Inkblot Test, 3) Thematic Apperception Test, 4) Min­
nesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), and 5) Human 
Figure Drawings. This battery was chosen to be representative 
of a typical test battery employed by many of the subjects. 
Because of limited time availability of the professionals 
involved, a time limit of 1§ hours was placed on subjects 
in this group for completion of their tasks. All subjects 
in the group appeared to be able to comfortably complete the 
procedure within this time limit.
Client. The female client about whom information was 
provided was an actual counseling client who voluntarily 
agreed to participate. The client evidenced concerns over 
dependency and achievement, and appeared anxious and de­
pressed. Extensive precautions to safeguard the identity 
of the client were taken. All subjects were required to
Effects of Information
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make judgments about the same client.
Trait rating instrument. The client was also asked to 
rate herself on five-point scales on 15 personality dimen­
sions chosen from among those commonly appearing as assess­
ment dimensions on widely-used personality tests, such as 
"anxious," "caring," "independent," etc. An equal number 
of positive and negative terms were included. Rating was 
done at the conclusion of the counseling session which was 
taped for viewing as a part of the experimental procedure. 
Judgmental Tasks
After having acquired the information appropriate to 
their respective groups, judges were asked to complete a 
number of judgmental tasks concerning the client. Previously, 
three trained psychologists not otherwise participating in 
the experiment had sorted descriptions of the tasks as to 
whether they were predictive or evaluative in nature as com­
pared to a criterion example of the type reported by Kahne­
man and Tversky (1973). Only those tasks sorted in the same 
way by all three judges were retained in the experimental 
procedure. A description of the different judgmental tasks 
follows.
Predictive tasks. All subjects were asked to predict 
the client’s responses on the Trait Rating Instrument.
Effects of Information
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Evaluative tasks. S ’s were asked to rate the client 
on 15 five-point scales representing dimensions upon which 
counselors are frequently asked to characterize clients, 
such as anxiety, depression, trust, etc. Judges' responses 
were compared to those of the client's own therapist after 
twelve therapy sessions.
Confidence tasks. Counselors were asked to indicate 
their confidence in each judgment in terms of their estimate 
of the probability that they had made an accurate judgment. 
Thus, confidence estimates were made on a scale ranging from 
20 through 100 with 20 indicating a random chance of being 
accurate and 100 indicating absolute certainty of accuracy.
Other tasks. Upon completion of the predictive, evalu­
ative, and confidence tasks, judges performed a number of 
other tasks: 1) completion of the demographic questionnaire,
2) rating how well they liked the client as a person, 3) 
rating how similar the client was to themselves, 4) diagnosis 





Predictive and Evaluative Judgment Tasks
An absolute difference score was calculated for each 
judge between the judge's predicted responses for the client 
on the Trait Rating Instrument and the client's actual re­
sponses (Cronbach, 1955; Cronbach and Gleser, 1953; and Gage 
and Cronbach, 1955). This score was arrived at by summing 
the difference without regard to sign between the client's 
response and the judge's prediction of her response on each 
item of the Trait Rating Instrument. These difference 
scores can be thought of as representing the judge's pre­
dictive accuracy with regard to the client on the Trait 
Rating Instrument. These scores also indicate how well the 
judges were able to see the client as she saw herself.
Range of possible scores is zero (highest accuracy) to 60 
(lowest accuracy). A score of 30.would be expected by 
chance.
Similarly, an absolute difference score was calculated 
for each judge by summing the difference between the re­
sponses of the client's therapist and the judge for each of 
the evaluative dimensions (Evaluative Dimensions Instru­
ment). These scores can be conceptualized as representing
Effects of Information
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the ability of the judge to accurately evaluate the client 
from an external perspective. Again, possible scores range 
from zero (highest accuracy) to 60 (lowest accuracy) with a 
score of 30 representing chance accuracy.
Mean accuracy scores and standard deviations on the two 
judgment tasks for the three information conditions are shown 
in Table 2 and Figure 1. Accuracy of all judgments was 
greater than that expected as a result of chance. Although 
there was little effect of type of information upon accuracy 
for either the predictive or evaluative tasks, judges in all 
information conditions seem to have been more accurate in 
performance of the evaluative task than the predictive one.
Table 2 about here
Figure 1 about here
Confidence in Predictive and Evaluative Judgments
Confidence estimates for the predictive and evaluative 
tasks for the three groups receiving differing types of 
information are shown in Table 3 and in Figure 2. It ap­
pears that confidence in judgments increased with
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increasing information, especially for the evaluative task. 
Judges differed widely in the "stable level of general con­
fidence" (Little, 1961) which was characteristic of them, 
with confidence estimates ranging from 21 to 97.
Table 3 about here
Figure 2 about here
Assumed and Real Similarity
Cronbach (1955) noted the importance of taking into 
account the possible effects of assumed and real similarity 
between judge and subject when interpreting differences in 
predictive accuracy. He found that differences between 
judges in predictive accuracy may be a function of differ­
ences in assumed or real similarity between judge and subject 
rather than due to differences in information, experience, or 
other variables.
Table 4 depicts and compares the concepts of assumed 
and real similarity and predictive accuracy.
Table 4 about here
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An index of assumed similarity was computed for each 
judge between the judge's own self-description and the 
judge's prediction of the client's self-description. This 
score was arrived at by summing the difference without regard 
to sign between the judge's response and the judge's predic­
tion of the client's response on each item of the Trait 
Rating Instrument. These difference scores represent the 
extent to which a judge assumed that the client described 
herself in the same way the judge described himself or her­
self, or the extent to which the judge based predictions on 
"assumed similarity" (Cronbach, 1955).
An index of real similarity was also calculated for each 
judge. This was accomplished by adding the absolute differ­
ence between the judge's self-description and the client's 
self-description on each item of the Trait Rating Instrument. 
These scores indicate the extent to which the client and 
judge actually viewed themselves similarly.
Data on assumed and real similarity as compared to pre­
dictive accuracy are shown in Table 5 and Figure 3. Judges 
in the three information conditions did not differ from one 
another in similarity of self-descriptions to the client's 
self-description (real similarity). Neither, as shown pre­
viously, did they differ in accuracy of their predictions.
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It is apparent from Figure 3, however, that type of informa­
tion did have an effect on assumed similarity, as the group 
receiving only stereotype information appears to have made 
much greater use of "assumed similarity" (Cronbach, 1955) 
than those judges receiving more individualized information 
about the client. This was confirmed by the statistical 
analysis reported below.
Table 5 about here
Figure 3 about here
Effects of Information Type Upon Accuracy, Confidence, Real 
and Assumed Similarity
Accuracy scores for the predictive and evaluative 
tasks, their respective confidence estimates, and indices 
of real and assumed similarity were submitted to a one-way 
multivariate analysis of variance in order to test for over­
all effect of type of information. A Wilk's lambda of 
0.326 was obtained, yielding F (12, 44) = 2.76 with p =
.007. Thus, the multivariate analysis indicates that type 
of information did have an overall significant effect. In­
spection of the six univariate analyses of variance reveals
Effects of Information
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that a significant F was obtained in only one such analysis. 
The analysis of effect of information type upon assumed simi­
larity yielded F(2, 27) = 9.97 with p = .0006. Individual 
comparisons showed the Stereotype Group to differ signifi­
cantly from both the Stereotype-Video Group (F 1.27 = 19.44; 
p = .0001) and the Stereotype-Video-Diagnostics Group 
(F 1,27 = 7.90; p = .009). Thus, judges receiving minimal 
information alone did rely upon "assumed similarity" to a 
significantly greater extent- than did judges provided with 
more information about the client.
The univariate analyses of variance of accuracy scores 
for the predictive and evaluative tasks did not yield sig­
nificant results (F 2, 27 = 0.56; p = 0.58 and F 2, 27 =
1.20; p = 0.32, respectively). Therefore, judges provided 
with minimal information alone were as accurate in their 
judgments as judges who viewed the client and who addition­
ally studied her test protocols.
Analyses of variance of confidence estimates for the 
predictive and evaluative tasks also did not obtain signifi­
cant results. The analysis of effect of information type 
upon confidence in evaluations did approach significance, 
however, with a resultant F (2, 27) = 2.81 and p = .077. 
Appropriateness of Confidence
Correlations between accuracy scores for the predictive
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and evaluative tasks and their respective confidence esti­
mates are shown in Table 6. These correlations represent 
the extent to which confidence in judgments was warranted. 
Here, negative correlations represent greater appropriate­
ness of confidence, in which a small difference score is 
associated with high confidence and vice versa. Although 
none of the obtained correlations was statistically signifi­
cant from zero, nor did any differ significantly from the 
other, it is of interest to note that the only negative cor­
relation was found in the Stereotype-Video Information con­
dition for the predictive task. This indicates that judges 
who viewed the client but did not receive diagnostic mater­
ial seemed less confident in their ability to predict how 
the client saw herself when, in fact, their predictions 
were less accurate. Thus, their confidence in their predic­
tions was more appropriate.
Confidence in accuracy of their predictions appeared 
less warranted for those judges receiving test data than 
for those who only viewed the client. However, both of the 
groups who viewed the client evidenced greater appropriate­
ness of confidence than did the group who did not view her 
(Stereotype Group).
The groups did not appear to differ in appropriateness 
of confidence in their ability to evaluate the client as
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they believed her to be "in reality." All groups obtained low 
positive correlations indicating largely unwarranted confi­
dence in the accuracy of their judgments on this task.
Table 6 about here
Effects of Information Type on Diagnosis
Table 7 presents frequency of various primary diagnoses 
as a function of type of information upon which the diagnosis 
was based. Table 8 reports the same information for both 
primary and secondary diagnoses summed. These data did not 
lend themselves to statistical examination, as they violated 
the requirements of the chi-square test with regard to mini­
mum cell frequencies (Siegel, 1956, p. 178).
Some interesting differences in diagnoses made by 
judges receiving differing types of information should be 
noted, however. Only one primary diagnosis of depression 
or affective disorder was made by judges viewing the client 
but not receiving test data, whereas six judges who both saw 
the client and received test results diagnosed her in this 
way. In this respect, judges who received test data appeared 
to be more similar in their perception of the client to 
those who had never viewed her (Stereotype Group), five of 
whom gave a primary diagnosis of depression.
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For summed diagnoses, four Judges receiving only stereo­
type information diagnosed the client as obsessive-compulsive, 
whereas only one judge who actually viewed the client saw her 
in this way. Also, only one person who did not view the 
client diagnosed her as either hysterical or dependent per­
sonality, while nine judges who had seen her gave one of 
these diagnoses, four of which were primary diagnoses. Thus, 
type of information appears to have had some effect upon 
judge's perception of the client.
Table 7 about here
Table 8 about here
Effects of Information Type Upon Other Tasks
Means and standard deviations of judges' perceived 
liking of the client and perceived similarity to the client 
are seen in Table 9 and Table 10. Ratings were made on 
five-point scales.
Type of information had no effect upon either acknowl­
edged liking of or perceived similarity to the client.
Judges in the Stereotype-Video Group saw themselves as being 
slightly less similar to the client than did judges in the
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other groups. Real similarity indices reflect that this was, 
in fact, the case.
Table 9 about here




Effects of Information Type Upon Accuracy of Predictive and 
Evaluative Judgments
It had been hypothesized that, under the conditions in 
the current study, providing individualized clinical infor­
mation to judges in the Stereotype-Video and Stereotype- 
Video-Diagnostics groups would result in their being more 
accurate in their judgments about the client than judges who 
received stereotype information alone. This hypothesis was 
not supported by results of this study. Judges were able to 
perform both the predictive and evaluative tasks as accu­
rately" based upon minimal information as they were with the 
additional information provided by viewing the counseling 
session and studying the test material. These findings are 
in agreement with those of previous studies which have found 
judgments based upon minimal information to be as accurate 
as those based on more individualized data, in most cases 
(Soskin, 1959; Stelmachers and McHugh, 1964). In the pre­
sent study, this was true even though judges were able to 
see a counseling session with the client and with tasks 
which were more clinically relevant. That Rodin (1975) 
found increased accuracy with increased information about 
the client may be attributable to the fact that judges in
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her study were allowed to self-select information upon which 
to base their judgments. This was not the case in the cur­
rent study, although the test information provided was repre­
sentative of the type of data routinely used in practice by 
many of the judges. Complex differences among studies in 
types of judgment tasks employed, type of information pro­
vided, client-related variables, and conditions under which 
judgments were made make interpretation of differences in 
results extremely difficult.
It could be argued that the analog nature of the pre­
sent study contributed to the findings of no information 
effect upon accuracy of judgment by removing judges from the 
actual clinical setting. This would not appear to be the 
case, however, since viewing of the client on videotape 
does appear to have had an effect upon diagnostic percep­
tions of her and upon assumed similarity to her.
It should be noted that the current study employed only 
measures of average relative accuracy across a number of 
predictive and evaluative judgments. Thus, ways in which 
differing types of information might have differentially 
affected accuracy in specific predictions and specific 
evaluations were not examined here. It may well be that 
differing information types might have affected accuracy 
in different specific judgments in different ways.
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Although this question was beyond the scope of the current 
study, it is one which should certainly be given considera­
tion in further research.
Soskin (1954, 1959) found projective material to result 
in increased perception of maladjustment in the client. Thus, 
it has been further hypothesized that diagnostic material in 
general might result in a set to "objectively evaluate" a 
client rather than an attempt to understand the client as 
she saw herself, which might be facilitated by merely viewing 
her. This would have resulted in greater accuracy of the 
Stereotype-Video-Diagnostics Group on the evaluative task 
and greater accuracy of the Stereotype-Video Group on the 
predictive task. No significant differences in accuracy 
between the groups on either of the two tasks was obtained 
in the current study. It is of interest to note, however, 
that, while they were not more accurate in their judgments 
on the predictive task, judges in the Stereotype-Video 
Group did seem to evidence greater appropriateness of con­
fidence in their ability to accurately understand how the 
client saw herself. That is, judges in this group were 
more confident that their predictive judgments were accu­
rate when they were, in fact, accurate and less confident 
when their judgments were, in fact, less accurate.
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Inspection of Figure 1 indicates that judges in all 
groups appear to be more accurate in their evaluations than 
in their predictions. It is not possible to ascertain on 
the basis of the present data, however, whether differences 
in accuracy on the two tasks are attributable to: 1) the
differences in degree of extrapolation required from the 
available data (prediction or evaluation), 2) the different 
perspective on the client which each task involves (external 
or internal), or 3) merely the specific differences in the 
two tasks employed in the study. In regard to this latter 
possibility, the greater accuracy on the evaluative task 
may simply reflect that psychologists are better able to 
predict the responses of another psychologist (client's 
therapist), expressed in clinical terms, than they are to 
predict the responses of a client in more general descrip­
tive terms.
Confidence and Appropriateness of Confidence in Predictive 
and Evaluative Judgments
It had been hypothesized that increased information 
would result in increased confidence, in line with the 
findings of Oskamp (.1965). Although differences in confi­
dence between the information conditions were not found to 
be statistically significant, they did closely approach
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significance with the evaluative task. The trend of in­
creased confidence in evaluations with increasing information 
is clearly seen in Figure 2. a similar trend, though less 
pronounced, is also seen for the predictive task. These 
findings are generally in agreement with those of Oskamp 
(1965), who found a large increase in confidence with in­
creased amounts of case-summary material. In the present 
study, this effect was obtained with experimental proce­
dures designed to more closely approximate clinical practice, 
including observation of the client's counseling session.
The great variability in individual "stable level of confi­
dence" (Little, 1961) noted in the confidence estimates 
undoubtedly contributed to lack of statistical significance 
in the current study.
Further research in the area of confidence.in clinical 
judgments should attempt to control for the effect of dif­
fering "stable levels of confidence" among individual judges, 
perhaps through the use of an analysis of covariance tech­
nique.
It appears from Figure 2 that addition of test data 
made a large contribution to the apparent increase in con­
fidence. Addition of test data did not result in overall 
increased accuracy of judgments, however (Figure 1). It
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would seem, then, that test material gave judges a false 
sense of confidence in their ability to make accurate judg­
ments about the client. This is reflected in the data on 
appropriateness of confidence seen in Table 6, and is also 
in agreement with similar findings by Oskamp (1965).
It had been hypothesized that judges in the Stereotype- 
Video Group would be more appropriately confident in their 
judgments on the predictive task, while those in the Stereo- 
type-Video-Diagnostics Group would evidence greater appro­
priateness of confidence on the evaluative task. Although 
differences in appropriateness of confidence were not sta­
tistically significant, they were in the hypothesized direc­
tion for the predictive task. As noted earlier, judges who 
only viewed the client, but did not receive diagnostic ma­
terial, seemed to be more appropriately confident in their 
ability to see the client as the client saw herself than 
judges who also received test data. Thus, judges who did 
not see test data seemed to have a better understanding of 
when they were right and when they were wrong in their 
predictions.
That information type appears to have had some effect 
on appropriateness of confidence for predictions and not 
for evaluations is also of interest, though a clear expla­
nation of this difference is not possible within the
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framework of this study. Again, this may be a function of 
the content- and criterion-related differences between the 
predictive and evaluative tasks employed here.
Effects of Informâtion Type Upon Assumed and Real Similarity 
Judges in the three information conditions did not dif­
fer significantly in similarity of their self-descriptions 
to the client's self-description (real similarity). However, 
type of information did have a significant effect upon as­
sumed similarity. (See Table 5 and Figure 3.)
Judges receiving only minimal information (Stereotype 
Group) assumed similarity between their self-descriptions 
and the self-description of the client to a much greater 
extent than did judges receiving more individualized infor­
mation about the client, It appears that, lacking any exten­
sive personal information about the client, judges in this 
group were forced to base their ideas about how she saw 
herself to a large extent upon their own self-descriptions, 
assuming their own responses to be typical of the responses 
of human beings in general.
Effects of Information Type Upon Diagnosis
Effects of information type upon diagnosis of the client 
may be seen in Tables 7.and 8. As previously noted, Shrauger 
and Altrocchi (1964) discussed the fact that selection ef­
fects may obtain when the person judged is not actually
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seen, but judged on the basis of descriptive material alone. 
Such effects related to viewing or non-viewing of the client 
are readily apparent here in terms of diagnosis. Four 
judges who had received minimal information about the client, 
but who had not viewed her, diagnosed her as obsessive- 
compulsive, whereas only one judge who had seen her diag­
nosed her in this way. This appears to be directly related 
to the stereotype associated with computer science majors 
as rigid, compulsive individuals. Though judges in all 
three information conditions were given the information 
that the client was a computer science major, those judges 
who were additionally able to view the client seem to have 
been able to free themselves from this stereotype.
Conversely, only one person who did not view the client 
gave a diagnosis of either hysterical or dependent perso­
nality, while nine judges who had seen her diagnosed her in 
one of these ways. Again, it appears that the Stereotype 
Group was operating from the notion of a computer science 
major as an individual who is independent and unemotional, 
whereas judges who actually saw the client perceived her in 
a much different way. These findings appear to be consis­
tent with those of Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) regarding the effects of reli­
ance upon the representativeness heuristic when making
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judgments. Those subjects in the Stereotype Group appear 
to have made that diagnosis (obsessive-compulsive) which was 
"representative" of the data (computer science major). In 
this case, however, the client was not typical, in this respect, 
of the stereotype, and the resulting judgment was in error.
It is also noteworthy that providing judges with test 
data appears to have influenced their diagnostic perception 
of her. Only one judge who viewed the client but did not 
receive test data about her diagnosed her primarily as 
depressed, while six judges who both viewed her and received 
her test results gave the primary diagnosis of depression.
Thus, addition of test data seems to have contributed to the 
perception of the client as depressed. Five judges who had 
never seen the client also gave a primary diagnosis of de­
pression. Thus, judges who had test data were similar in 





In the current study, providing clinicians with an op­
portunity to view the client in a counseling session and with 
test data regarding the client did not result in improved 
accuracy in predictive and evaluative judgments about her. 
There did appear to be a trend, however, for greater amounts 
of information about the client to result in inappropriate 
increases in clinicians' confidence in their judgments about 
the client.
Type of information about the client did seem to have an 
effect upon diagnosis of the client, with those clinicians 
not having viewed her describing her as more obsessive- 
compulsive, and those having viewed her diagnosing her more 
frequently as dependent or hysterical personality. Those 
clinicians receiving test data about the client more often 
viewed her as depressed than did those clinicians who did not 
receive test data.
Finally, it was found that clinicians who received only 
stereotype information about the client relied to a much 
greater extent upon "assumed similarity" in making judgments 




Thus, type of information about a client seems to affect 















































































Means and Standard Deviations 
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NOTE: Range of possible scores is zero to 60. A score of





Confidence in Predictive and Evaluative Judgments 
































NOTE : Range of possible confidence scores is 20 to 100.
A score of 20 represents minimal confidence, while 
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and Predictive Accuracy 














































NOTE : Range of possible scores is from zero to 60. A
score of 30 represents chance similarity or accu­





Correlation of Accuracy with Confidence 












































































































































Mean Rated Liking of the Client 
on a Five-Point Scale 

























Mean Perceived Similarity to the Client 
on a Five-Point Scale 
























Mean Accuracy of Predictions and Evaluations 
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Mean Confidence in Predictions and Evaluations 
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Mean Assumed Similarity, Real Similarity, and 
Predictive Accuracy as a Function 
of Information Type
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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The present study is designed to investigate several 
meaningful aspects of clinical judgment. An examination 
will be made of the manner in which different types of infor­
mation available to the clinician affect the accuracy of his 
predictive and evaluative judgments and his confidence in 
these judgments. The following section of the paper will 
relate these variables (type of information, type of judg­
ment, and confidence) to previous relevant research, and a 
rationale for the current investigation will be developed.
Differing Types of Information 
First, attention is directed to the effects of differ­
ing types, or amounts, of information upon the counselor's 
perceptions of the client. The rationale for administration 
of psychological tests to clients would appear to be that 
testing provides additional information with which to better 
understand the client in one or both of two important ways: 
(a) from an "external" perspective in terms of the "actual" 
personality dynamics of the client as it has import for 
making clinical judgments (e.g., therapy approach, hospi­
talization, court-related decisions, etc.), and (b) from an
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"internal" reference point in terms of understanding how the 
client sees himself or herself. This latter type of under­
standing has been conceived by some to relate to the process 
of "empathy" in therapy which Rogers (1957) and Carkhuff 
(1967) have envisioned as of such great importance to posi­
tive process change. Lesser (1961) found "predictive empathy" 
(the ability of the counselor to predict accurately certain 
responses of the client, such as his self-rating on perso­
nality traits) to be significantly related to client- 
perceived empathy. Carr. (1974) concluded from the results 
of his study that where client and therapist were similar in 
precision of conceptual differentiation among people (dif­
ferential predictive accuracy) and where client and therapist 
commonly endorsed a large number of self-descriptive con­
cepts, client/therapist communication was more successful 
and resulted in the client's perception of positive treat­
ment effects. If testing contributes to our understanding 
of the client's self-perception, then, it indeed is of 
positive value.
On the other hand, many therapists question the value 
of psychological testing, objecting that far from aiding in 
understanding of the client, diagnostic material actually 
impedes understanding of him through the creation of re­
sponse sets, resulting in "stereotyping" and
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"pigeon-holing" of clients. This notion would appear to 
receive some support from Soskin's (1954) finding that data 
from projective tests predisposed judges to overestimate 
maladjustment of a client. If test material does result in 
certain biases in clinical judgment, the clinician should 
become aware of these biases, gain an understanding of how 
they operate, and correct for their influence upon his 
judgmental processes.
While a relatively large number of studies in the area 
of interpersonal or social perception (primarily done in the 
1950's to early 1960's) have dealt with the effect of dif­
fering types of information upon the judge/counselor’s 
ability to make accurate predictions about the subject/ 
client, results of these studies have been equivocal.
Hamlin (1954) reviewed a series of ten studies of judg­
ment utilizing projective material (Albee and Hamlin, 1949; 
Albee and Hamlin, 1950; Bialick, 1950; Bialick and Hamlin, 
1954; Cummings, Hamlin, Albee and Leland, 1950; Hamlin, 
Berger, and Cummings, 1952; Hamlin and Newton, 1952; Newton, 
1954; Newton and Goodman, 1952; and Whitmyre, 1953). He 
concluded that the accuracy of such judgments is related to 
the simplicity or complexity of the material judged and to 
the conditions provided for making the judgments. He found 
that small, mechanically scored or judged units of
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information tend to result in poor predictive accuracy, as 
do overly large complex units, unless conditions for judgment 
approach actual clinical procedures.
In a 1957 study, Borke and Fiske found no significant 
differences in the accuracy of judges' predictions about a 
client whether they interviewed the client directly, observed 
the client from behind a one-way mirror, listened to an audio 
recording of the interview, or read a verbatim transcript. 
Borke and Fiske interpret their findings to mean that cli­
nicians in their study relied primarily on content cues when 
making their predictions. Segel (1952) and Giedt (1955) 
reported similar findings. It should be noted, however, as 
Borke and Fiske point out, that the heavy reliance on con­
tent cues found in these studies is interpretable in terms 
of demand characteristics of the experiment, as judges were 
attempting to predict a subject's performance on a verbal 
task, such as a Q-sort. They suggest that if judges had 
been asked to make different kinds of inferences, such as 
those related to affect of the client, they might have 
utilized other (non-content) cues to a far greater extent. 
This question of the effect of different kinds of informa­
tion upon different kinds of judgments will be addressed 
in the current study.
The effect of differing types of information upon
Effects of Information
58
judges' perceptions was assessed in a series of studies by 
Soskin (1954a; 1954b; 1959). In the 1954a study, Soskin 
found that trained clinicians initially had a more unfavor­
able stereotype of an experimental subject than did graduate 
students provided with minimal information about the subject. 
However, it was also found that providing the graduate stu­
dents with projective test information (TAT) resulted in an 
increase in "unfavorableness" of their judgments. In addi­
tion, training in the use of the TAT did not result in in­
creased accuracy of judgments by the students. Soskin con­
cludes that "projective tests predispose (clinicians) toward 
an overestimation of maladjustive trends in postdiction 
situations." Soskin himself calls attention to the fact 
that clinicians are infrequently called upon to postdict 
specific situational behaviors of the types employed in this 
study, and points out that the information available from 
the projective devices may not have been relevant to the 
postdictions required of the judges.
In a second 1954 study, Soskin investigated frames of 
reference in personality assessment. He studied a number 
of clinical judgments made in the assessment of first-year 
graduate students who had been accepted for admission to 
APA-approved clinical training programs. He concluded that 
judges markedly differed in their descriptions of the
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experimental population as a function of the type of infor­
mation with which the judges were provided, the relationship 
between judge and subject, and the purpose for which judg­
ments were being made. The extreme complexity of the experi­
mental design and lack of adequate experimental control in 
this study, however, make reliable interpretation of the 
findings extremely difficult.
The 1959 Soskin study also is subject to a number of 
methodological criticisms, predominantly related to ques­
tionable relevance of available cue configurations to the 
judgments required. Judges were provided with either
1) biographical data; 2) a Rorschach protocol; 3) data from 
a battery of objective and projective tests; or 4) the op­
portunity to view the subject in a number of role-play 
situations. Results indicated that none of the three types 
of critical data improved accuracy scores beyond the level 
achieved by study of biographical facts alone. After 
studying the Rorschach protocol, .in fact, Rorschach judges 
showed a significant decrease in accuracy on postdiction 
items compared to their "stereotype" predictions (those 
based on minimal information). As in previous studies, use 
of Rorschach information also resulted in predictions more 
characteristic of "maladjustment."
Of interest is the fact that significant group
Effects of Information
60
differences in perception of the subject by the role-play 
and the Rorschach judges existed at the initial stage 
(stereotype stage) of the experiment when they were supplied 
only with biographical data and before exposure to the re­
spective experimental conditions (i.e., viewing role-plays 
or studying Rorschach data). Soskin speculates that this 
difference may be due to different "response sets" operating 
in the two groups based upon knowledge of the experimental 
procedures to follow for their particular groups. That is, 
"mere knowledge that their next task would demand further 
blind appraisal based on the Rorschach alone (might have) 
heightened the sensitivity or the responsiveness of Ror­
schach judges to adverse signs in the biographical data."
This difficulty can be circumvented by utilizing a separate 
"Stereotype Group" for obtaining stereotype base lines 
rather than asking each judge in the experimental groups to 
serve as his own control. This procedure will be followed 
in the present investigation.
Kostlan (1954) provided judges with different types of 
information and observed the effect upon predictive accu­
racy. Experimental conditions were: 1) Rorschach missing,
2) MMPI missing, 3) Sentence Completion Test missing, 4) 
Social Case History missing, or 5) minimal data only.
Kostlan found that predictions based upon minimal data
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were better than chance and that Social Case Histories were 
required to increase accuracy above that achieved by minimal 
data alone. Batteries which included both the MMPI and the 
Social Case History provided the greatest accuracy of pre­
diction. Patterson (1955) criticized the Kostlan article on 
a number of statistical points, but Kostlan (1955) defended 
the conclusions of his earlier study.
In a study designed in part to improve upon the method­
ology in the Kostlan (1954) study, Horowitz (1962) also 
examined clinical judgment based upon projective test proto­
cols, Subjects were required to predict responses to a 
64-item Q-sort chosen to represent personality areas com­
monly covered in psychological test reports. It should be 
noted that the criterion to be predicted here was not the 
response of the client himself or herself on the measure as 
in the typical study, but the Q-sort description of the 
client made by a therapist who had seen the patient for a 
minimum of twenty hours in psychotherapy. The three pre­
diction sources evaluated were: 1) brief biographical
information concerning the client, 2) biographical informa­
tion plus a test battery, 3) base rate descriptions obtained 
by having a group of 15 therapists perform the Q-sort on 
their respective 15 clients and construction of an "average 
client" (or base rate) Q-sort from this. Predictions on
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the basis of biographical information alone were made by 
both a group of trained clinicians and a group of naive 
judges. All other judgments were made only by trained 
clinicians.
Horowitz found that base rate predictions were as accu­
rate as those based upon projective data. (This is, of 
course, interpreted as support for the efficacy of "statis­
tical prediction.") However, access to test information 
did increase the accuracy of clinicians' predictions beyond 
that achieved through biographical information alone. In­
deed, without the test information clinicians' predictions 
were significantly less accurate than the base rate predic­
tions. Horowitz concludes that projective data were useful 
only insofar as they enabled the clinicians to sub-cate- 
gorize patients. She points to the need for further inves­
tigations into the effect of information upon clinical 
judgment, and suggests that: "It would be valuable to learn
exactly what information the clinician does use, as well as 
what sort of inferences he makes from it and how accurate 
these inferences are."
Luft (1950) made a similar suggestion in calling for 
"post mortems" in prediction studies in an attempt to verify 
implicit hypotheses and "thus (improve) the basis for cli­
nical theory and judgment." In line with this idea.
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Kleinmuntz (1963a, 1963b, 1963c) had a clinician "think 
aloud" into a tape recorder as he made judgments about the 
adjustment of college students on the basis of their MMPI 
profiles, and then used these reports to construct a computer 
program modelling the clinicians' judgmental processes.
Other researchers (Oskamp, 1962) have requested judges, upon 
completion of their predictions, to write out a brief de­
scription of the manner in which they made their inferences.
A study by Stelmachers and McHugh (1964) investigated 
the effect of seven types of information upon predictive 
accuracy. Four of the information types were of a stereo­
type nature: 1) age and sex, 2) education and occupation,
3) whether the subject was a "well-adjusted normal," a 
"person with long-standing chronic illnesses," a "psychia­
tric patient," or a "delinquent," and 4) a combined input 
consisting of the sum of the above three stereotype inputs. 
The remaining three types of information were comprised of 
more individualized data: 1) free description, in which
intimate acquaintances of the subject wrote short personal 
descriptions about him, 2) trait cluster data, in which the 
intimate acquaintances were asked to select from a set of 
adjectives those five most descriptive of the subject, and
3) total input, consisting of a Biographical Questionnaire, 
Interest and Activities Questionnaire, Sentence Completion
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Test, and Case History Material. Upon the basis of selected 
inputs, clinicians and nursing students made predicitons of 
the responses of four subjects on certain MMPI items and bi­
polar traits. Predictive accuracy was found to be greatest 
based upon the total input information described above, al­
though it was significantly superior only to the "Age and 
Sex Stereotype," and the "Free Description" inputs. In fact, 
the "Combined Stereotype" input resulted in next greatest 
accuracy and was not statistically significantly inferior to 
the "Total Input." Stelmachers and McHugh conclude from 
their results that predictive accuracy depended little upon 
the type of information upon which the judgments were based. 
They interpreted achieved predictive accuracy in terms of 
reliance upon response sets of "Social Desirability," "Nor­
mality," and "Assumed Similarity." They also determined 
base-rate predictors for relevant populations for the sub­
jects, and found this base rate data to result in predictive 
accuracy equal to that based upon the best information for 
all but the most "deviant" subject (that subject most 
atypical of the base rate populations), who was predicted 
more accurately by clinicians with access to test informa­
tion. It should be noted, however, that in neither case 
(base rate data or clinical predictions for the atypical 
subject) was accuracy significantly above chance level.
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Stelmachers and McHugh view their results as lending support 
to the relative efficacy of "statistical prediction" methods, 
but state that it seems to be "worthwhile to utilize exten­
sive individualized information in most cases if this infor­
mation is fairly objective, and largely unmediated, system­
atically collected, and partially produced by the subject 
himself..."
In two related studies, Hjelle (1968) and Taft (1966) 
investigated the accuracy of judgments about subjects as a 
function of the judges' familiarity with the subjects. It 
may be assumed that increased familiarity with an individual 
affords one quantitatively more information and a greater 
variety of types of information about the individual. Re­
sults of both studies indicated that predictive accuracy 
increased with increasing familiarity, although judgments of 
all subjects were significantly more accurate than would be 
expected by chance. That one can more accurately judge 
someone with whom he is more familiar hardly seems a 
startling finding, but Taft (1966) points to two factors 
which might mitigate against increased accuracy of predic­
tion with increased familiarity. First, in his 1959 study, 
Taft found that increasing amount of information beyond some 
optimal point may actually interfere with efficacy of use
Effects of Information
66
of existing information and lead to decrease in predictive 
accuracy. This finding seems to parallel that of Hamlin 
(1954), discussed above, concerning optimum complexity of 
projective materials to be judged. Taft also points to the 
fact that increased familiarity with an individual might 
result in certain emotional biases which could interact with 
familiarity and possibly "reduce the contribution which 
familiarity might make to the accuracy of judgments." This 
was not found to be the case, however. Judges appeared to 
be able to use the greater information associated with 
greater familiarity with the subjects to make more accurate 
judgments about them.
In a more recent study, Rodin (1975) studied the pre­
dictive accuracy of judges who were allowed to self-select 
their information. In her study, Rodin also calculated 
"Information Coefficients" for the available pieces of in­
formation which indicated "objective information value" of 
an item. Rodin speculated that failure of a number of 
earlier studies to find evidence for increased predictive 
accuracy as a function of increased information may have 
been due to the lack of relevance of information given the 
judges to the judgments required of them. She hypothesized 
that allowing judges to choose their own information accord­
ing to individual information preferences would result in
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their being able to make more accurate judgments. Results 
of the two experiments she reported support this hypothesis. 
She found that when allowed to self-select information 
deemed helpful to them, judges were able to predict with 
greater accuracy than a stereotype group. She also found 
that predictive accuracy was not correlated with the "objec­
tive information value" of the information items chosen. 
Judges choosing that information objectively rated "best" 
were less accurate than judges with objectively "inferior" 
information. She concludes that "the value of information 
to individual judges is not well-described by objective 
information value measures." While Rodin’s methodology 
results in improved cue-criterion relevance, the judgment 
tasks involved are of questionable relevance to those re­
quired in clinical settings.
Few generalizations relating.to the effects of differ­
ing types of information upon predictive accuracy can be 
made from the findings reviewed above. The differences among 
studies in terms of judgments required, criteria to be pre­
dicted, and other experimental procedures employed were 
rarely systematic and make direct comparison of results ex­
tremely difficult. However, one relatively consistent 
finding seems to be that certain types of information can 
result in response biases in the perception of the client.
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Another finding which seems to recur is that predictive accu­
racy is about as good (or sometimes better) when responses 
are based upon minimal or "stereotype" information as when 
based upon more complex information, such as test data. How­
ever, the fact that Rodin (1975) did obtain increased pre­
dictive accuracy with improved cue-criterion relationships 
supports her contention that much of the past failure to 
find increased accuracy with increased information may be a 
function of the irrelevance of the information to the judg­
ments required. It is the feeling of the present author that 
the one thing which is strikingly apparent from a review of 
the foregoing studies is that most of them employ question­
able cue-criterion relationships and lack relevance to the 
judgments actually required of the practicing clinicians. 
Indeed, one is almost tempted to ask the question,
"Where is the 'Person' in person-perception?" Most studies 
requesting judges to make judgments concerning a subject 
have not even allowed the judges to view the individual about 
whom they are to make decisions, but have asked for judgments 
based solely on diagnostic or descriptive information. 
Shrauger and Altrocchi (1964) comment upon this difficulty; 
"...an important source of individual variability 
in the judgment process may well be differences in 
cues chosen as bases for judgments. Selection can
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occur in studies in which the person judged is not 
actually observed by the judges, but the data about 
him are presented in brief vignettes or descrip­
tions of his personal attributes."
As mentioned earlier, those studies which have provided 
for viewing of the subject/client by the judge/counselor 
have suffered from what would appear on the whole to be 
highly tenuous cue-criterion relationships. That is, the 
relevance of the information given to the judgments required 
has been questionable. For example, judges have been asked 
to view films of interviews with subjects (not therapy 
clients) made at shopping centers (Cline, 1955; Cline and 
Richards, 1958; Cline and Richards, 1960), and then asked to 
fill out standard psychological test protocols as they be­
lieved the targets had done. Rodin (1975) justifiably 
criticized the cue-criterion relationship in the Cline and 
Richards study (1960), but herself employs judgment tasks 
of dubious clinical relevance and does not allow for viewing 
of the individual to be judged. One may question why, given 
the opportunity to watch films of individuals at a supermar­
ket talking about various topics, judges should be expected 
to accurately predict their responses to psychological tests. 
Another example of poor cue-criterion selection is the 
Soskin (1959) study in which judges are asked to postdict
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specific behaviors of an individual based on either differ­
ing types of descriptive or diagnostic material or (but not 
in addition to) on observation of the subject (not a client) 
role-playing a number of vignettes in which he played such 
roles as a "new young superintendent of a boy's correctional 
school discussing school policy with veteran staff members, 
etc.". The subject, however, was not seen by judges in the 
"role" of himself. Not only do such contrived role-plays 
appear clinically irrelevant, but the items which judges 
were asked to postdict seem to be equally far-removed from 
considerations actually encountered in a clinical setting. 
Consider, for example, a typical postdiction item from the 
Soskin (1959) study involving a subject "David":
On one occasion two foreign students who had 
completed their studies and were leaving the 
school arranged a small party for their friends.
Some mild spirits were available to those inte­
rested, although as nearly as can be ascer­
tained, nothing stronger than wine was served.
In this school, opinion is divided on the matter 
of social drinking. Some students object 
strongly, others are more tolerant of moderate 
social drinking. Members of both groups were 
present at the party.
Effects of Information
71
a) At first, David was a little uncomfortable, 
but he joined in, swapped stories with the 
rest and drank.
b) After a couple of drinks, he began a rather 
unconvincing act of being slightly intoxicated, 
began to slur his speech, walk uncertainly, etc.
c) He conspicuously refused a preferred drink, 
and shortly after reprimanded the host for 
serving liquor to such a gathering.
d) He remained throughout the party, but made 
careful note of the persons who accepted 
drinks and those who told questionable stories 
and subsequently dropped them from his list of 
social acquaintances.
It would appear that such predictions are rarely asked 
of practicing clinicians.
In order to assess experimentally the effects of dif­
fering types of information upon -the counselor's judgments 
about a client, the present investigation will include the 
following information conditions:
1) A Stereotype Condition, in which counselors are 
provided with minimal information about an actual 
client, such as age, sex, educational or occupa­
tional status, and the fact that he/she is a
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is a counseling client.
2) A Stereotype-Video Condition, in which counselors 
view an actual video-taped counseling session in­
volving the client in addition to receiving the 
minimal information outlined above, and
3) A Stereotype-Video-Diagnostics Condition, in which 
counselors receive the minimal information, view 
the videotape, and additionally are provided with 
diagnostic material obtained from the client.
Specific hypotheses relating to the information condi­
tions will be treated at another point in this paper.
In an effort to make research in the area more clinic­
ally relevant, as has been strongly urged by a number of 
authors (Horowitz, 1962; Kostlan, 1964; Oskamp, 1962; Rodin, 
1975; Shrauger and Altrocchi, 1964), and to improve experi­
mental cue-criterion relationships, an attempt has been made 
in the present study to ask judges to make clinically- 
relevant judgments on the basis of clinically-relevant 
material, both through use of diagnostic material and obser­
vation of an actual counseling session with an actual client, 
The clinically-related judgment tasks to be employed will 
be discussed in detail in the appropriate section of the 
paper, but it should be mentioned at this point that these
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tasks were constructed to more closely approximate the kinds 
of judgments or conceptualizations which clinicians routinely 
make in clinical practice.
Confidence
A second major area of consideration in the current 
investigation involves the clinician's confidence in judg­
ments . A number of studies have been concerned with this 
variable.
Forer and Tolman (.1952) asked clinical psychologists to 
rate the items of a sentence completion test (blank form) as 
to how potentially clinically useful they felt each to be. 
They also asked the judges to rate the confidence they felt 
in each of their judgments. They found that individual 
clinicians varied from one another in general level of con­
fidence in their judgements in a consistent, systematic way. 
Judges who were generally highly confident in their judgments 
were found to be most confident when in disagreement rather 
than agreement with the group. Highly confident judges 
also tended to be more extreme in their judgments.
Block and Petersen (.1955) measured the confidence of 
subjects in psychophysical judgments and concluded that con­
fidence in "such judgments is correlated with personality 
characteristics of the judges." They found overly confident 
subjects to be more rigid and dogmatic, while overly cautious
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subjects appeared more introspective and inclined toward 
self-abasement. Individuals with more realistic confidence 
in their judgments, on the other hand, seemed to be more self- 
reliant and socially perceptive.
Little (1961) also found evidence for the existence of 
a stable "level of general confidence" characteristic of 
individuals. He asked 48 experienced clinical psychologists 
to make certain judgments about a subject based on a test 
protocol (either the Rorschach, TAT, Make-a-Picture-Story 
Test, or MMPI). Twelve test subjects from four diagnostic 
categories were employed. Re-test on the task was performed 
in 4-6 weeks after the original test. Little obtained:
1) estimates of generalized confidence levels of each judge,
2) measures of reliability of decision (proportion of items 
left unchanged from test to retest, and 3) correlations 
between confidence in a judgment and whether that item 
changed from test to re-test. Little reported the following 
findings with regard to confidence and reliability of judg­
ments: first, the relative ranking of judges in generalized
confidence was quite stable across judgments. Secondly, 
there was no significant relationship between average confi­
dence of judges and reliability of their judgments. Last, 
decisions which remain unchanged from test to re-test were 
those in which the judges had greater original confidence.
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Analysis revealed no significant mean differences in gener­
alized confidence levels among judges working with different 
types of protocols or with patients of different diagnoses.
On the basis of his findings, Little calls for a distinc­
tion between "confidence” and "certainty." "Confidence" 
would thus be defined as a judge's "generalized confidence 
in his decisions," whereas "certainty" would refer to the 
"momentary certainty or uncertainty (of the judge) produced 
by the difficulty of the particular task for him." He con­
cludes that :
. . . there is substantial evidence that confidence 
is unrelated to either the accuracy or reliability 
of judgments, but is quite a stable personality 
characteristic, whereas certainty is quite positively 
related to reliability of judgments and is much more 
determined by the immediate difficulty of judgment. 
Findings supporting the view that confidence is a general 
personality trait substantially uncorrelated with validity 
or reliability of decisions are also reported by Trow 
(1923), Seward (1928), D. M. Johnson (1939, 1955) and L. C. 
Johnson (1957).
Wolff (1955) studied the generality of two types of 
"certainty" ("subjective" and "behavioral") and their rela­
tionship to manifest anxiety. Subjective certainty was
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defined as "the degree of conviction experienced consciously 
by any given subject," Behavioral certainty referred to the 
"amount of information requested by subjects before making 
choices." Sixty college women performed a series of tasks 
scored for either behavioral or subjective certainty; 1) a 
paired-associates learning task, 2) a story completion task,
3) an angle estimation task, 4) a question-answering task,
5) an adjective check-list task, and 6) completion of the 
booklet form of the MMPI.
Findings indicated little generality of uncertainty 
across the highly varied and unusual tasks employed. Little 
support was found for a relationship between manifest anxiety 
and uncertainty as measured,
Goldberg (1959) examined the effect of clinical exper­
ience upon accuracy of diagnostic judgment and judges' con­
fidence in such judgments. He asked staff psychologists, 
psychology trainees, and nonprofessional judges (secretaries) 
to attempt to diagnose organic brain damage on the basis of 
Bender Gestalt test protocols. The criterion of accuracy 
was independent diagnosis by a competent neurological team.
He found that the three groups of judges did not differ in 
their ability to make such diagnoses accurately. (an "ex­
pert" in use of the Bender was able to make more accurate
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diagnoses than the clinicians.) However, differences in con­
fidence in judgments were found as a function of level of 
experience of the judges. Goldberg found that his most ex­
perienced judges were least confident in their judgments, 
whereas untrained judges were found to be the highest in 
confidence. He concluded that ". . . i n  such ambiguous 
decision situations increased experience may have the effect 
of increasing cautious skepticism.”
Oskamp (1962) also investigated accuracy of and confi­
dence in predictions as a function of clinical experience 
and training. Judges were 44 clinical psychologists (about 
half staff members and half trainees) and 28 undergraduate 
psychology majors. Judges were asked to decide on the basis 
of MMPI profiles whether a patient was psychiatrically or 
medically hospitalized. Oskamp found that although clini­
cians were more accurate in their judgments than inexper­
ienced judges, the magnitude of the difference in accuracy 
of the two groups was not great enough to be significant.
As did Goldberg (.1959), Oskamp found that confidence was 
significantly decreased by general experience and that addi­
tionally "appropriateness of confidence" (correlation between 
confidence in a judgment and accuracy of that judgment) 
increased significantly with increasing experience. This 
prompted Oskamp to venture the following definition of
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clinical expertise: "In short, the expert must know when he
is apt to be right and when he is more apt to be wrong."
In a study which is especially relevant to the present 
experiment in terms of the variables examined, Oskamp (1965) 
studied the effects of differing amounts of information upon 
judges’ confidence and accuracy. Oskamp gave his judges four 
sets of cumulatively increasing amounts of information about 
a case subject. Stage 1 information included only minimal 
biographical data. Stage 2 added material about the sub­
ject’s childhood through twelve years of age. Stage 3 infor­
mation covered the subject’s high school and college years, 
while Stage 4 material consisted of history of his adult life. 
Upon the basis of the information currently available to them, 
judges were asked to attempt to answer correctly multiple 
choice items concerning the case subjects and to indicate 
their confidence in each prediction. Oskamp found that as. 
amount of information increased, confidence soared while 
accuracy did not increase significantly. It should be noted 
once again, however, that judgments were made only on the 
basis of case-summary material, without the judges ever 
having viewed the subject of their judgments.
The current study allows for more clinically-meaningful 
examination of the question of the effect of differing amounts 
or types of information upon the judge’s confidence through
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allowing the judge to observe in an actual clinical session 
the individual to be clinically judged. Confidence is also 
related to type of judgment, as will be seen in the following 
section of the paper.
Prediction vs. Evaluation 
In the present study, the question of whether clinicians 
are equally confident in their predictions and their evalua­
tions is also considered. The distinction between "predic­
tion" and "evaluation" is discussed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1972, 1973) and Tversky and Kahneman (1971, 1974) as it 
relates to judgmental heuristics. These authors have found 
that when people are asked to make predictions or judgments 
under conditions of uncertainty, they do not appear to 
"follow the calculus of chance or the statistical theory of 
prediction." Instead they seem to rely on a few heuristics 
(i.e., representativeness, availability, adjustment from an 
anchor) which "sometimes yields reasonable judgments and 
sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors." Kahneman 
and Tversky (1973) reported a series of experiments the 
results of which illustrate the reliance of judges upon the 
"representativeness heuristic" and have clear implications 
concerning clinical judgments.
In one study a group of college students (base-rate 
group) serving as judges were asked to guess the percentage
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of U.S. graduate students enrolled in each of nine areas of 
specialization. A second group of subjects (similarity group) 
were given a brief personality sketch of an individual and 
then asked to indicate (by ranking) how similar they believed 
the individual described to be to the average graduate student 
in the nine fields of specialization. A third group of sub­
jects (prediction group) were given the personality sketch 
along with additional information designed to call into ques­
tion the validity and reliability of the information contained 
in the sketch (i.e., the fact that the sketch was written 
several years previously and that it was based solely on pro­
jective tests). Judges in the prediction group were then also 
asked to rank the nine fields of specialization in order of 
the likelihood that the individual described in the sketch 
was a graduate student in each of the fields.
They found that the judgments of likelihood were vir­
tually identical to the judgments of similarity, but differed 
significantly from the base-rate estimates. Following the 
prediction task, judges were asked to estimate the percentage 
of correct choices which could be achieved with several types 
of information (a confidence measure). The judges' estimate 
was only 23 percent for predictions based on projective tests 
as compared to 53 percent, for example, for predictions based 
on "high school seniors' reports of their interests and
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plans." It would seem that the subjects (graduate students 
in psychology) had little confidence in judgments based on 
projective tests. As Kahneman and Tversky point out, however: 
"Nevertheless the graduate students relied on a description 
derived from such tests and ignored the base rates." Since 
their expected accuracy was low, judges should have weighted 
base-rate data heavily according to the rules of statistical 
prediction, but this was not done. To quote Kahneman and 
Tversky:
In general, three types of information are relevant 
to statistical prediction: (a) prior or background
information (e.g., base rates of fields of specialty);
(b) specific evidence concerning the individual
case (e.g., the personality sketch of the individual);
(c) the expected accuracy of prediction (e.g., the 
estimated probability of hits). A fundamental rule 
of statistical prediction is that expected accuracy 
controls the relative weights assigned to specific 
evidence and to prior information. When expected 
accuracy decreases, predictions should become more 
regressive, that is, closer to the expectations 
based on prior information. In the case of Tom W ., 
expected accuracy was low, and prior probabilities
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should, have been weighted heavily. Instead, our 
subjects predicted by representativeness, that is, 
they ordered outcomes by their similarity to the 
specific evidence, with no regard for prior 
probabilities.
In another study, Kahneman and Tversky further explored 
the effect of prior versus individuating evidence upon pre­
dictions. They found that when judges were given no infor­
mation about an individual, they based their predictions 
about him on base-rate data. However, when given the least 
bit of worthless individuating evidence concerning the indi­
vidual, judges ignored base-rate data altogether and made 
extreme predictions,
Kahneman and Tversky also found that subjects' judgments 
were equally extreme when they were asked to predict a remote 
objective criterion on the basis of sketciy information as 
when they were asked merely to evaluate the information it­
self. Subjects were given a description of a college fresh­
man in which he was described by a counselor in a very 
positive way. An "evaluation" group was asked to evaluate 
the descriptions by estimating ". . . the percentage of 
students in the entire class whose descriptions indicate a 
higher intellectual ability." "Prediction" groups were 
given the same descriptions and asked ". . . t o  predict the "
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GPA achieved by the student at the end of his freshman year 
and his class standing in percentiles."
That they were asked to make predictions on the basis 
of highly incomplete data of questionable relevance to the 
prediction did not cause judges to normalize their predic­
tions or use base rate data, as would be prudent. Kahneman 
and Tversky explain their findings on the basis of the "rep­
resentativeness heuristic," That is, judges will make that 
prediction which seems to be "representative" of the data no 
matter how incomplete the information or how irrelevant the 
information may be as a basis for prediction. Holzworth and 
Doherty (1974) also report findings that show subjects’ 
judgments to be based on the "representative heuristic."
It is felt that the distinction between "evaluating" an 
input and "predicting" an outcome is highly relevant to the 
clinician, who is frequently asked to evaluate a client and 
in addition make some prediction about the client's future 
performance,
A hypothetical, simplified example of the distinction 
between "evaluative" and "predictive" judgments, applied to 
a clinical situation, might be:
A clinician has available the information that a 
particular client obtained an F+% of 25 on the 
Rorschach. The clinician is asked:
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1) To evaluate how that F+% compares to that of 
the average member of some stated population 
(e.g., normals, psychotics, etc.).
2) To predict how effective a parent the client 
will be to a three-year-old child or how 
likely the client is to commit a violent 
crime, etc.
The current author feels that the distinction between 
evaluations and predictions made by Kahneman and Tversky 
might be conceived of in terms of a judgment continuum 
ranging from "descriptive" on the one end, through some 
intermediate point "evaluative" to "predictive" at the oppo­
site extreme. As one moves from left to right across the 
continuum, the degree of extrapolation required from the 
data at hand increases. That is, the judgment required 
becomes less and less closely tied to the actual cue confi­
guration and greater "leaps of inference" are required.
 Description Evaluation Prédiction
< >
Increasing Extrapolation
In their 1955 paper on methodological problems in interper­
sonal perception. Gage and Cronbach make a similar analysis: 
"Understanding another person may be regarded as
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having two stages, which suggest two continua for 
classifying investigations. First, the judge must 
take in information about the Other, perhaps by 
observing him, perhaps by dealing with him over a 
period of time; the first continuum therefore deals 
with the degree of acquaintance of the Judge with 
the Other. Second, the Judge must•interpret the 
information in order to arrive at a predictive 
statement; the second continuum therefore deals 
with the degree of extrapolation or inference 
required between Input and Outtake. An experiment 
may be designed to make great demands on the in­
take process (little acquaintance) or the inter­
pretive process (much extrapolation) or both, or 
neither.”
As also pointed out by Gage and Cronbach, Meehl (1954) 
makes a similar consideration in discussing two possible 
meanings of the term "clinical intuition." First, it can 
refer to the situation in which the clinician cannot be 
articulate about the evidence for his diagnosis. Secondly, 
it may allude to the instance in which he cannot "show in 
what manner a particular hypothesis was arrived at from the 
stated evidence,"
The distinction made by Meehl (1960) of three classes
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of functions performed by the psychodiagnostician appears to 
deal in part with the degree of extrapolation from available 
information necessitated by each. He lists the following 
diagnostic functions:
. . . formal diagnosis (the attachment of a noso­
logical label); prognosis (including "spontaneous" 
recoverability, therapy-stayability, recidivism, 
response to therapy, indications for differential 
treatment), and personality assessment other than 
diagnosis or prognosis. This last may be divided 
somewhat arbitrarily into phenotypic and genotypic: 
the former being the descriptive or surface fea­
tures of the patient's behavior including his social 
impact ; the latter covering personality structure 
and dynamics, and basic parameters of a constitu­
tional sort,
Meehl's concept of "prognosis" would appear to corre­
spond to judgments characterized as "predictive" on the 
above-described continuum, while "phenotypic" and "geno­
typic" resemble "descriptive" and "evaluative," respectively.
According to this conceptualization, one would conceive 
of the previous example in a slightly different way:
A clinician has available the information that 
a particular client obtained an F+% of 25 on the
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Rorschach. The clinician is asked:
1) Descriptive
To compare that F+% to the average F+% of 
some stated population (e.g., normals, psy- 
chotics, etc.)
2) Evaluative
To characterize the individual on a continuum 
of emotional disturbance or ability to test 
reality appropriately (e.g., "The individual 
is severely emotionally disturbed." Or,
"The individual evidences extremely poor 
reality testing,"
3) Predictive
To predict how effective a parent the client 
will be to a three-year-old child or how 
likely the client is to commit a violent 
crime, etc.
On this continuum, what Kahneman and Tversky term 
"evaluation" is conceived to be more "descriptive" in nature. 
The predictive class of judgment is obviously the most risky 
based upon such limited information and the prediction should 
be normalized, or not made at all, because of this. It 
should be noted that such a prediction is risky not only 
in that it involves very large inferences on the basis of
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questionable cue-criterion relationships, but it is also 
risky in terms of practical consequences to the individual 
involved. However, in line with the representativeness 
heuristic, one would expect the clinician to predict in 
agreement with what seems "representative” of the data 
(e.g., F+%=25=pathological). Thus, he would be anticipated 
to make predictions consistent with pathology, merely because 
they "fit" that data at hand no matter how insufficient the 
data may be to justify such predictions.
Cronbach (1955) referred to exactly this same phenome­
non when he stated: "Evidently the fault of the clinician
is in too little central tendency of judgment. . ." and 
made this cautionary injunction:
"If the judge is forced to base his judgment on 
inadequate cues or if the available personality 
theory and situational knowledge do rot permit 
trustworthy inference, then he should treat people 
as if they were very nearly alike."
Cronbach also stresses the need for investigation in 
this area:
"Systematic errors such as overoptimism and over­
differentiation may be corrected fairly easily.
It is important for studies of clinical judgment 
to measure these errors as separate components.
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and for clinicians to train themselves to avoid 
these errors,"
In an extremely interesting and stimulating paper, Ein- 
horn and Hogarth (1978) discuss confidence in judgments 
which are subject to heuristic biases and relate such ap­
parently unwarranted confidence to three main factors:
1) "lack of search for and use of disconfirraing evidence,"
2) "lack of awareness of environmental effects on outcomes," 
and 3) "the use of unaided memory for coding, storing, and 
retrieving outcome information." They make the following 
suggestions for alleviation of these problems: first, "for­
mal instruction in experimental design, and teaching the 
logic of control groups and baseline predictions," second, 
the use of a model of the environment as per Hammond (1971) 
to help gain awareness of environmental effects on outcomes; 
and third, keeping a "box score" tabulation of judgments 
and outcomes. This latter suggestion was made previously
by Goldberg (1968) in his discussion of the learning of 
clinical inference. To quote Goldberg:
"For learning to occur, some systematic feedback 
regarding the accuracy of the judgmental response 
must be linked to the particular cue configuration 
which led the clinician to make that judgment.
But in clinical practice feedback is virtually
Effects of Information
90
non-existent, and in the relatively rare cases 
where feedback does occur the long interval of 
time between the prediction and the feedback 
serves to ensure that the initial cue configu­
ration leading to the prediction has disappeared 
from the clinician's memory.”
Goldberg postulated that three conditions must exist if 
complex clinical inferences are to be learned: 1) some kind
of feedback is a "necessary, though not necessarily a suf­
ficient condition for learning to occur;" 2) the order of 
cases must be rearranged so that clinical hypotheses can be 
"immediately verified or discounted;" and 3) it may be 
necessary "to tally the accuracy of one's hypotheses" by 
pencil-and-paper means. These suggestions would certainly 





Subjects. Subjects will consist of 30 professional counselor/ 
therapists with experience in individual therapy and in diag­
nostic testing. Each clinician will be required to provide 
demographic data relating to professional experience, as in 
Oskamp (1962), and theoretical orientation. Subjects will be 
randomly assigned in equal numbers to the following condi­
tions: 1) Stereotype Condition, 2) Stereotype-Video Condi­
tion, and 3) Stereotype-Video-Diagnostics Condition, 
Experimental Conditions and Procedure. Those subjects in the 
Stereotype Condition will be given minimal information about 
an actual counseling client, such as age, sex, educational 
or occupational status, and the fact that he/she is a coun­
seling client. In addition to receiving the minimal infor­
mation about the client, subjects in the Video Only Condition 
will view an actual video-taped counseling session involving 
the client. Subjects in a Video-Diagnostics Condition will 
receive the minimal information, view the videotape, and 
additionally be provided with diagnostic material obtained 
from the client, Viewing of the videotape and study of the 
diagnostic material will be counterbalanced for order of 
presentation, Diagnostic data will be presented in protocol 




Tests to be included in the battery are: 1) Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale, 2) Rorschach Inkblot Test, 3) Thematic 
Apperception Test, 4) MMPI, and 5) Human Figure Drawings.
This battery is chosen to be representative of a typical test 
battery commonly employed by many of the subjects. Judges 
will be allowed to follow their customary procedures for in­
terpretation of the diagnostic material, including having 
sufficient time for study of the data, as suggested by 
Hamlin (1954).
The client will also be asked to rate himself/herself 
on five-point scales on a number of personality dimensions 
(Trait Rating Instrument), These dimensions were chosen 
from among those commonly used by psychologists to describe 
personality characteristics and frequently employed as 
assessment dimensions on widely-used personality tests, and 
include such terms as "Orderly," "Anxious," and "Independent." 
Terms included will be counterbalanced so that an equal 
number of favorable and unfavorable terms are rated. In a 
small pilot study, the Trait Rating Instrument detected dif­
ferences in predictive accuracy for judgments concerning 
more-well-known and less-well-known Others, and between a 
trained Judge and untrained Judge.
Client, The client viewed will be an actual counseling 
client in a counseling session. The client will be chosen
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to present a problem of mild to moderate proportions, such 
as a situational disturbance, mild to moderate depression 
and/or anxiety, etc. At any rate, severely disturbed clients 
will not be considered for presentation. All possible steps 
will be taken to safeguard the confidentiality of the client. 
The counselor who takes part in the videotaped counseling 
session will not otherwise participate in the experiment and 
will have no knowledge concerning the design or purpose of 
the experiment other than being told that the general purpose 
of the study is to gain knowledge in the area of clinical 
judgment. In addition, the counselor will be told, prior to 
taking part in the taping, that the conduct of the experiment 
will at no time require judgments of any kind to be made of 
his/her counseling style or ability. He/she will be informed 
that the videotape in which he/she takes part will be used 
merely as an "analog client" for experimental purposes.
Although the analog nature of the study removes the 
judges one step from the actual stimulus-object (client) 
which they are required to judge, it is felt that the addi­
tional control of cue configurations gained through the 
analog method is important enough in the current study to 
outweigh this disadvantage. In fact, Gage and Cronbach 
(1955) recommend just such a procedure in the investigation 
of interpersonal perceptual accuracy : "Another device is
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to use a 'standard Other," requiring everyone whose accuracy 
is tested to make predictions for the same individual or 
group."
Judgmental tasks. After having acquired the information 
appropriate to their respective groups (1) minimal informa­
tion, 2) minimal information + viewing videotaped session, 
or 3) minimal information, videotape, and diagnostics), 
judges will be required to complete a number of judgmental 
tasks concerning the client about whom they received informa­
tion. Some tasks will be of a "high extrapolation" ("pre­
dictive") and some of a "low extrapolation" ("evaluative") 
nature of each task to be performed, three trained psycholo­
gists not otherwise taking part in the experiment will sort 
descriptions of the tasks as to whether they should properly 
be considered predictive (or requiring less extrapolation 
from the data) or evaluative (or requiring less extrapola­
tion from the data), as compared to a criterion example of 
the type reported by Kahneman and Tversky. Only those tasks 
sorted in the same way by all three psychologists will be 
retained in the experimental procedure.
1) High Extrapolâtion (Predictive) Tasks. Experimental 
subjects will be asked to rate the client on a number of per­
sonality trait dimensions as they believe the client rated 
himself/herself. That is, they will be asked to predict the
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client's responses on the Trait Rating Instrument. Counselors 
will also be asked to rate themselves on the Trait Rating 
Instrument in order to explore the possibility that "Assumed 
Similarity" or "Real Similarity" between counselor and client 
is correlated with the counselor's predictive accuracy (Cron­
bach, 1955; Cronbach and Gleser, 1953; Gage and Cronbach, 
1955). For each counselor, a difference score will be cal­
culated between his predicted responses for the client and 
the client's actual responses, as per Cronbach (1955), Cron­
bach and Gleser (1953), and Gage and Cronbach (1955). This 
score can be thought of as representing the counselor's 
predictive accuracy with regard to the client on the Trait 
Rating Instrument, These difference scores will be submitted 




Stereotype = Stereotype-Video = Diagnostics 
Predictive Predictive Predictive
Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
This hypothesis tests the effect of differing types of 
information upon the counselor's ability to see the client 
as the client sees himself. It permits one to ascertain 
whether different types of information result in any improve­
ment or deficit in predictive accuracy beyond that which can 




Some previous studies have found "stereotype" information 
to result in more accurate predictions than more complex in­
formation regarding the client. However, these studies have 
not allowed for viewing of the client in an actual counseling 
session, as does the current study. It is predicted that this 
availability of highly relevant client-related cues will re­
sult in improvement in predictive accuracy of the Stereotype- 
Video Group as compared to the Stereotype Group (that group 
with only minimal information). The Stereotype-Video- 
Diagnostics Group will also be exposed to the client cue 
configuration made available to the Stereotype-Video Group, 
of course, but expectations about this group's performance 
require scrutiny.
The familiarity studies reviewed earlier (Hjelle, 1968; 
Taft, 1966) indicated that accuracy of prediction increased 
with increasing familiarity (presumably involving the avail­
ability of more information). In the current study, the 
Stereotype-Video-Diagnostics Group possesses the greatest 
amount and variety of information about the client. There­
fore, we might expect that this group would be most "famil­
iar" with the client, and hence most able to make accurate 
predictions concerning the client. This hypothesis might 
receive some support from results of the Borke and Fiske
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(1957) study which indicated that clinicians relied heavily 
on content cues for verbal prediction tasks. Since the 
Stereotype-Video-Diagnostics Group of the current study is 
provided with the most content cues (content of session + 
test data), it might be speculated that they could predict 
most accurately the client's responses on the Trait Rating 
Instrument, a verbal prediction task.
On the other hand, Taft (1959) found that "beyond a 
certain point, more information is a handicap and may even 
interfere with the correct use of existing information."
He speculates that in such cases, judges may give "too much 
weight to some data, and far too little to other, more rele­
vant data." Perhaps this would account for the findings of 
Soskin (1954a, 1954b, 1959) and of Weinberg (1957) that pro­
jective data resulted in biases in perception of the indi­
vidual to be judged. It may be that judges tended to give 
too much weight to the projective data, which certainly does 
appear to have been of questionable relevance to the judg­
ments required in these studies. This is further supported 
by the findings of Kahneman and Tversky (1973, 1974) and 
others, that judges frequently tend to "overpredict" on the 
basis of insufficient or irrelevant data. With improved 
cue-criterion relevance, Rodin (1975) did find increased 
information about the subject to result in increased
Effects of Information
98
accuracy of predictions. Horowitz (1962) also found that 
access to test data improved predictive accuracy above stereo­
type accuracy; however, the criterion for her predictions was 
not the actual response of the client, as in the "prediction" 
required in the present study, but the response of the client's 
therapist, as in the current "evaluation" task.
It would seem that determination of the relevance of the 
particular information possessed by each group of judges to 
the specific judgment required of them would provide for for­
mulation of the most probable hypothesis.
For the Stereotype-Video-Diagnostics Group, then, the 
question could become, "How relevant is the diagnostic data 
to prediction of the client's self-perception?" While infor­
mation of the type contained in the diagnostic material may 
be relevant to understanding him/her from an "external" ref­
erence point (i.e., what are the "actual" personality 
dynamics of the client), this may have little to do with 
understanding his view of himself, as asked in the current 
task. In fact, test material may result in a "set" to 
"objectively evaluate" the client, rather than encouraging 
the judge to consider how the client sees himself, thus 
resulting in inferior performance of the required task.





Stereotype-Video V Video-Diagnostics \ Stereotype
Predictive /  Predictive Predictive
Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
Results will be discussed in relation to this hypothesis 
and the literature reviewed earlier.
2) Low Extrapolation (.Evaluative) Tasks, "Evaluative” 
tasks are those which received consensual validation as re­
quiring less extrapolation as compared to "predictive" tasks 
by a panel of three psychologists, as described earlier. In 
these tasks, counselors will.be asked to evaluate the client, 
based on what they know about the client, on five-point 
scales corresponding to various "evaluative dimensions."
For example:
"From what you know about the client, how anxious 
a person do you believe he/she is?"
Extremely Anxious Slightly Not Very Not at All
Anxious Anxious Anxious Anxious
"From what you know about the client, how open and 
expressive of feelings do you think he/she is, in 
general?
Extremely Open Somewhat Not Very Not at All
Open Open Open Open
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These "evaluative dimensions" are chosen to represent 
variables according to which counselors are frequently asked 
to characterize clients in a broad way, i.e., is the client 
an "anxious" person?"; "is the client an open, expressive 
person?," etc.
The criterion for determining accuracy of a judge's 
evaluation of the client is defined as the corresponding 
evaluation of the client made by the client's own therapist 
after 12 sessions of therapy. Although this is, of course, 
in actuality a measure of inter-judge reliability, it is felt 
that it can provide for a meaningful comparison when viewed 
in terms of "accuracy." It would be assumed that the greater 
opportunity of the client's therapist to observe him person­
ally upon a greater number of occasions in more varied cir­
cumstances would allow for greater accuracy of evaluation. 
This receives support from Luffs (1950) finding that a 
patient's therapist was more accurate in making predictions 
about him than were 34 of 35 clinical judges serving as 
subjects. The findings of Hjelle (1968) and Taft (1966) 
that greater familiarity with the individual to be judged 
resulted in greater predictive accuracy also support the 
use of the therapist's rating of his client as a criterion 
for predictive accuracy. Finally, Horowitz (1962) employed 
the therapist's rating of his client as the criterion in
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her study of accuracy of clinical judgment.
A difference score will be calculated for each counselor 
between his responses concerning the client and the responses 
of the client's therapist about him. This score is taken to 
represent the accuracy of the judge's evaluation of the client 
on the Evaluative Dimensions Instrument described above.
These difference scores will be submitted to a one-way analy­
sis of variance in order to test the following null hypothe­
sis :
Stereotype-
Stereotype = Stereotype-Video = Video-Diagnostics 
Evaluative Evaluative Evaluative
Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
This hypothesis tests the effect of differing types of 
information upon the counselor's ability to accurately 
evaluate the client on a number of dimensions commonly em­
ployed by psychologists in evaluating clients. It permits 
one to ascertain whether different types of information 
result in any improvement or deficit in evaluative "accuracy" 
beyond that which can be achieved by knowledge of minimal 
or "stereotype" information alone.
If, as postulated above, diagnostic material results 
in a "set" to "objectively evaluate" a client rather than 
attempt to see the client as the client sees himself, the 
Stereotype-Video-Diagnostics Group would have the advantage
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in the current task which requires just such judgments. 
Therefore, the following experimental hypothesis is made: 
Stereotype-
Video-Diagnostics \ Stereotype-Video \ Stereotype
Evaluative Evaluative Evaluative
Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
Results will be discussed in relation to the above 
hypothesis and previous relevant findings.
3) Confidence Tasks. Counselors will be required to 
indicate their confidence in each judgment they make regard­
ing the client according to the method of Adams (1957) and 
Oskamp (1962, 1965). They defined the confidence scale in 
terms of expected percentages of successful judgments.
As confidence has been shown to increase dramatically 
with increased information, the following hypotheses are 
advanced relative to the effect of differing types of 
information upon judges' confidence in predictions and 
evaluations :
Stereotype-





Video-Diagnostics y Stereotype-Video \ Stereotype
Evaluative Evaluative Evaluative
Confidence Confidence Confidence
Test of these hypotheses will be made by submitting
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confidence scores to appropriate statistical analyses.
Where both confidence scores and accuracy scores are 
available for a particular type of Judgment, examination will 
be made of the "appropriateness" of judges' confidence (i.e., 
is greater confidence in a judgment associated with greater 
accuracy of that judgment?). Both confidence and accuracy 
scores will be available for responses on the Trait Rating 
Instrument (predictive task) and for responses on the Evalu­
ative Dimensions Instrument (evaluative task). In line with 
the previous hypotheses concerning the effect of differing 
information upon accuracy of predictions and evaluations:
Stereotype-
Stereotype-Video Video-Diagnostics Stereotype






Evaluative y Evaluative \  Evaluative
Appropriateness Appropriateness Appropriateness
Confidence Confidence Confidence
That is, differing types of information are expected to 
affect appropriateness of confidence differentially depend­
ing upon what type of judgment task is involved (i.e., one 
greater or lesser extrapolation form the data),




(1) How well did you like the client as a person?
Very Fairly Slightly Not Very Not at
Much Well Much All
(2) How much like you was the client?
Very Quite a Bit Somewhat Not Much Not at All
Much Like Me Like Me Like Me Like Me
Like me
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Information for Prospective Participants
I am Ruth Ann Mertens, a doctoral student in Counseling 
Psychology at the University of Oklahoma.
I am conducting a research study on the ability of psy­
chologists to understand the people they are trying to help.
To do this, it is necessary to make videotapes of real 
clients working with actual counselors. As you are a client 
here at the Counseling Center, I am asking you to consider 
participating in this project. In addition to allowing 
videotaping of your counseling session, you would be required 
to take a battery of standard psychological tests. The 
videotape would then be shown to other professional counselors 
and psychologists to measure how well they can understand a 
client. Your responses on the psychological tests would also 
be made available to the professionals to see if this infor­
mation helps in understanding a client.
Participation in this project will in no way affect the 
type or quality of counseling which you will receive here at 
the Counseling Center. The counseling will not be an experi­
ment, but will be traditional, using standard, accepted 
techniques. Results of the psychological tests will be 
discussed with you for purposes of increased self-understanding, 
and you will receive a fee of $25 as remuneration for the time
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spent in taking the tests if you are selected to participate 
in the study.
You will not be eligible to participate in the project
if you commute to the University from the Oklahoma County
area. Also, I am interested in videotaping only clients with 
certain types of concerns. Because of this, if you believe 
you are interested in participating, I will need to discuss 
with you briefly why you think you would like to see a 
professional counselor.
If you think you are interested, or if you have any









Legally Effective Informed Consent for Client
It is important that you understand fully the purpose 
of this project and your participation in it. Please feel 
free to ask any questions or make any comments now or at any 
time during the project. As I read this statement, I will 
periodically stop so that you may ask questions. Please feel 
free to interrupt me at any time. This form explains fully:
1) The nature and purpose of this study
2) How the tapes of counseling and the test responses 
will be used
3) Any possible risks to you
4) The obligations of the investigator
5) Your responsibilities and your rights.
1, Nature and Purpose of This Study
If you agree to participate in this project, you will 
receive counseling from a qualified counselor here at the 
University of Oklahoma. You are in no way obligated to par­
ticipate in this project in order to receive counseling at 
the Counseling Center. You will receive exactly the same 
counseling whether or not you participate in the project.
I would like to stress that this is not an experiment on a 




The counseling session will be conducted in a standard 
office here in the counseling center with only you and your 
counselor present. The videotape equipment is a standard 
part of the office equipment and will be operated by your 
counselor. At the end of your counseling session, you will 
be asked to fill out a brief questionnaire about how you see 
yourself. This will take about five minutes.
You will also be asked to take a battery of well-known, 
standard psychological tests, including both intellectual and 
personality tests. This battery will be administered by me 
and should take approximately six hours to complete. Testing 
will be done in two sessions of approximately three hours 
each, which can be scheduled at mutually agreeable times.
Upon completion of the testing, you will be paid a fee of 
$25 as compensation for your time. At a later date, I will 
schedule an appointment with you for discussion of the test 
results. You may find these helpful in increasing your 
self-understanding. Your counselor will also be present 
at our meeting.
Before any taped material or test responses are shown 
to the professional counselors and psychologists who will 
participate in the study, you will be allowed to review all 
of the taped material and will have an opportunity to discuss 
the test results with me. At this time, you may ask that any
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part of the tapes be edited out and/or that any testing 
material not be shown to the professionals. I will review 
the tapes with you and also may suggest that some of the 
tapes be edited. You are not required to review or edit the 
tapes, but you have the right to do so.
2, How the Tapes Will Be Used
If after viewing the tapes and discussing the test results 
you choose to allow this material to be used in the project, 
it will be shown only to qualified, trained professional 
counselors and psychologists who hold the M.D., Ph.D., M.A. 
or M.S. degrees.
Before any subject will be allowed to view the tape or 
the testing material, they will be asked to read and sign 
this form (give copy of Appendix to client). After these 
people view the tape and/or see the test responses, they will 
fill out the same brief questionnaire you completed after the 
counseling session seen in the tape as they believe you filled 
it out,
The purpose of this study is to measure how different 
types of information about a client help a counselor to 
understand the client. If counselors with access to your 
test responses are closer to your self-description than those 
without your test data, it may indicate that such test data 
contribute to a counselor's understanding more fully how a
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client sees himself. This information is important for 
counselors if they are to be best able to understand their 
clients. This is the entire purpose of the project: to
attempt to measure how well people can understand another 
individual based on the kind and amount of information they 
have about him/her.
3. Possible Risks to You
It is unlikely that anyone viewing the tape or the test 
data will know you or ever come into contact with you. The 
tapes will not be shown in Norman, Oklahoma or in any other 
place you do not wish them to be shown. They will be shown 
only to professional counselors and psychologists who have 
a thorough understanding of your right to confidentiality.
You will not be identified by your name in any material used. 
However, there does exist a possibility that you may be recog­
nized by someone viewing the tapes. Therefore, you will want 
to ask that any information contained in the tape or test 
material which you believe could be personally identifying 
or troublesome be edited out. Furthermore, after reviewing 
the tape and discussing the test results, you may withdraw 
from the project completely and the tapes will be destroyed.
I do not wish for there to be any harm to you in any way. 
Therefore, if I believe there to be any reasonable chance of 
negative effects, I will not use the tape or test material.
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If this is the case, I will inform you that the material will
not be used.
4. Obligations of the Investigator
It is my obligation:
A. To pay you $25 upon your completion of the psycho­
logical test battery.
B. To discuss with you the results of the test battery 
for purposes of your self-understanding.
C. To completely inform you of all your rights in this 
project.
D. To allow you to withdraw from this project at any 
time prior to and including your review of the 
tapes and discussion of the test material.
E. To protect your identity as much as is possible as 
outlined in this statement and the Instructions of 
the Experimental Subjects (Appendix).
5. Client Responsibilities and Rights
A. You have the right to discontinue this project any 
time up to and including your review of the tapes 
and discussion of the test data.
B. It is your responsibility to complete the question­
naire and psychological test battery as honestly and 
fully as you are capable of doing.
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C. It is your responsibility to decide whether or not 
you wish for the counselors and psychologists to 
view the tape and see the test material.
E. It is your responsibility to decide whether you 
consider there to be any undue risk of harm to 
yourself by having the professionals view the tape 
and the test material. If, at any time up to and 
including your review of the material you believe 
there to be risk of harm, it is your responsibility 
to inform me and withdraw from the project.
By my signature, I state that I have read and fully 











Address Soc. Sec. #
Date of Birth
I, the undersigned client, do hereby authorize Ruth Ann 
Mertens, Doctoral student in the Counseling Psychology pro­
gram, College of Education, the University of Oklahoma, to 
videotape the counseling session between myself and my 
counselor at the University Counseling Center on this date 
for purposes of research. I understand that portions of the 
tape of my counseling session will be shown to professionals 
in mental health for purposes of research in the area of 
counseling skills,
I further understand that I am under no obligation to 
participate in this project. Furthermore, I understand that 
I will be allowed to view these tapes, and may at that time 
withhold my permission for the use of these tapes in research.
By my first signature, I do authorize the videotaping
of my counseling session at the University of Oklahoma
Counseling Center. I do also state that I have read and
understand the Legally Effective Informed Consent form
labeled Clinical Judgment Study I.
1 .   ...................................................




Witness Date Client Date
Address
By my second signature, I do hereby release the video­
tape and test data to be used for research purposes.
1 . ....................................................................................................
Witness Date Client Date
Address
2.









To: The University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board—
Norman Campus 
c/o Mark Elder
Office of Research Administration 
Buchanan Hall, Room #314 
From: Ruth Ann Mertens
Counseling Psychology Program 
College of Education 
842-3319 (home telephone)
I. A. Project Title: Clinical Judgment Study I
B. Principal Investigator: Ruth Ann Mertens, Counseling 
Psychology Program, 842-3319.
C. Sponsor's Name: Robert Ragland, Ph.D., 325-5975
D. Proposed Starting Date: September 15, 1980
II. Executive Summary: Clinical Judgment I
The purpose of this study is to examine the manner in 
which different types of information available to the coun­
selor affect the accuracy of his clinical judgments and his 
confidence in these judgments. To do this, it is necessary 
to make videotapes of a real client working with an actual 
counselor. I propose to tape such a counseling session at 
the Counseling Center, University of Oklahoma. The client 
will also be required to complete a questionnaire describing 
himself on dimensions commonly employed by psychologists to
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characterize clients. An example of such a questionnaire is 
included in this proposal and is labeled Appendix F. The 
client will further be asked to complete a battery of well- 
known and widely-used psychological tests including: 1) the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), 2) the Rorschach 
Inkblot Test, 3) the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT),
4) the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), 
and 5) Human Figure Drawings. I will personally administer 
these tests, and will discuss the results of the battery 
with the client accompanied by his counselor. These tests 
may be valuable to the client in helping him/her achieve 
better self-understanding. The client will also be paid a 
$25 fee to compensate him/her for the time spent in taking 
the test battery. Information about the client will then be 
made available to professional counselors and psychologists 
holding the M.D., Ph.D., M.A., or M.S. degrees and exper­
ienced in both counseling/psychotherapy and in psychological 
testing. These professionals will receive different types 
of information about the client. One group will be told only 
the age and sex of the client and that he/she is a student 
and a counseling client. A second group of professionals 
will receive this "minimal information," but will addition­
ally view a segment of the videotaped counseling session 
involving the client, A third group will have access to the
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information given the two other groups, but will also be 
given the test protocols of the client. The professional 
counselors will then be asked to perform a number of clinical 
tasks based upon the information they have received about 
the client. They will be asked: 1) to fill out the self­
description inventory (Appendix F) as they believe the client 
filled it out for him/herself; 2) to complete a questionnaire 
evaluating the client as they believe the client's own thera­
pist evaluated him/her after a number of counseling sessions 
(Appendix G); and 3) to complete a form making certain clini­
cal predictions about the client (Appendix H). The profes­
sional counselors will also be asked to indicate how confident 
they are in each of the judgments they make. Differences in 
accuracy of clinical judgments made by the three groups of 
professionals will be assumed to arise from the different 
types of information upon which the judgments were based.
This will allow us to consider which types of information 
lead to the greatest accuracy in which types of clinical 
judgments.
Because the client is required to describe himself 
genuinely, and respond genuinely to psychological tests, an 
actual client, rather than an actor playing the client's 
part, is required. Also, the experimental subject must have 
the opportunity to view the client in order to have access
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to critical non-verbal communication of the client. If sub­
jects are to be able to make accurate clinically-relevant 
judgments about a client, they must have access to actual 
clinically-relevant cues.
To protect the confidentiality of the client, his/her 
name will be deleted from the taped material and test data. 
Also, the client will be allowed to review and edit the tapes 
and discuss his test results with the investigator before 
releasing any material for research use. The client will be 
advised that he may withdraw from the project at any time 
prior to his/her release of the material.
A further protection of the client is that the experi­
mental subjects viewing the tapes will all be trained, quali­
fied professionals with a thorough understanding of the 
client's right to confidentiality. (See Appendix E.) Further­
more, the tapes will not be shown in Norman, Oklahoma or in 
any other place in which the client requests they not be 
shown, so that there is little likelihood of recognition of 
him/her by a subject,
Also, I will personally screen clients for this study 
with respect to the type and severity of the problem for 
which they are seeking counseling. Only clients with less 
serious problems will be used. Examples of such problems 
might be a situational disturbance, mild to moderate
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depression or anxiety, etc. In no case will a seriously- 
disturbed individual be considered for participation.
Finally, my doctoral advisor will screen any material 
(tapes and test data) before its use in the experiment. A 
more detailed discussion of client safeguards will be found 
in the Informed Consent accompanying this proposal.
Any risk to the client is considered to be minimal.
There are no physical risks involved. Also, if the client 
provides legally effective informed consent, it indicates 
his/her understanding that professional counselors will have 
access to the counseling information and that he/she perceives 
no harm in this process. Since the client will be allowed 
to review the tapes and edit any part and will discuss the 
test results with the investigator, and since the client will 
have the opportunity to remove him/herself entirely from the 
project, there exists little possibility of psychological or 
social risk of harm.
The client may benefit by his/her participation in the 
study in the following ways: 1) the administration to the
client at no charge of intellectual and personality tests 
and the discussion of their results with the client for pur­
poses of his self-understanding and growth; 2) receipt of 
the $25 fee as compensation for time spent in taking the 
test battery; 3) the opportunity to participate in an
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interesting project which may prove valuable in the training 
of professional counselors; and 4) possible credit toward 
research participation requirements in introductory psychology 
classes.
Experimental subjects should run no risk, as all data 
pertaining to them is anonymous. The primary benefit to 
them is that stated in 3) above. The social risk to the 
counselor in the videotape is very slight, as only the client 
will be seen in the tape. However, the remote possibility 
does exist of the counselor being recognized by his voice. 
Therefore, I will also obtain Legally Effective Informed 








Instructions to Experimental Subjects
Introduction to the Task
The purpose of this study is to measure the ability of 
counselors/psychotherapists to understand a client. You will 
be given some information about a client. After you have read 
the information, you will be asked to make some clinical judg­
ments about the client. Therefore, it is important that you 
try to understand the client as well as possible based upon 
the information you have about her.
Subject Protection
If you have any questions or comments concerning this 
project, please contact me, Ruth Ann Mertens, about this 
matter. My name and telephone number are listed at the 
bottom of these instructions. You are to tear them off and 
retain them for future reference.
Your responses in this study will be kept completely 
confidential and will not be associated with your name.
If you have read this statement and fully understand 
and agree to the instructions, you are asked to date and 
sign this statement. If you do not completely understand
Effects of Information
136
or completely agree to abide by these instructions, you are 





Tear off here and retian.
Clinical Judgment Study I
Experimenter: Ruth Ann Mertens, Counseling Psychology
Program, College of Education, University of 
Oklahoma.
Home Address: 2420 N.W. 45th, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma 73112 
Home Phone : 842-3119
Additional Sources of Information:
Mark Elder Robert Ragland, Ph.D.
Office of Research Adminis- College of Education
tration Room 308
Buchanan Hall, Room 314 University of Oklahoma
University of Oklahoma Norman, Oklahoma 73019









Instructions to Experimental Subjects
Introduction to the Task
The purpose of this study is to measure the ability of 
counselors/psychotherapists to understand a client. You 
will be shown a videotape of an actual counseling session 
and given some information about the client. After you view 
the videotape and read the information, you will be asked to 
make some clinical judgments about the client. Therefore, 
it is important that you watch and listen carefully so that 
you will understand the client as well as possible. 
Confidentiality of Information
The material you are about to see is considered very 
confidential. The client has been very gracious in allowing 
her private counseling session to be used for research pur­
poses. Any identifying information about the client has 
been changed or edited out of the material in order to 
protect the client's identity. It is very unlikely that you 
will ever come into contact with this person. However, 
under no circumstances should you ever discuss the person or 
material with anyone.
Subject Protection
If you have any questions or comments concerning this 
project, please contact me, Ruth Ann Mertens, about this
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matter. My name and telephone number are listed at the bottom 
of these instructions. You are to tear them off and retain 
then for future reference.
Your responses in this study will be kept completely 
confidential and will not be associated with your name.
If, when the tape is played, you recognize the client, 
please notify me immediately and the tape will be stopped.
If you have read this statement and fully understand 
and agree to the instructions, you are asked to date and 
sign this statement. If you do not understand or completely 
agree to abide by these instructions, you are asked to notify 
me at this time.
Name :.................'■.......  ■ ..... ............ ■.........
Signature
Address :............... . ............................
Date
Tear off here and retain.
Clinical Judgment. Study I
Experimenter: Ruth Ann Mertens, Counseling Psychology Program
College of Education, University of Oklahoma 
Home Address: 2420 N.W. 45th, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma 73112 
Home Phone : 842-3119
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Additional sources of information:
Mark Elder
Office of Research Administration 
Buchanan Hall, Room 314 
University of Oklahoma 




College of Education 
Room 308
University of Oklahoma 









Instructions to Experimental Subjects
Introduction to the Task
The purpose of this study is to measure the ability of 
counselors/psychotherapists to understand a client. You will 
be shown a videotape of an actual counseling session with a 
client and given test protocols of the client you view in the 
tape. You will also be given some information about the 
client. After you view the videotape, read the information, 
and study the test material, you will be asked to make some 
clinical judgments about the client. Therefore, it is im­
portant that you watch and listen carefully so that you will 
understand the client as well as possible.
Confidentiality of Information
The material you are about to see is considered very 
confidential. The client has been very gracious in allowing 
her private counseling session to be used for research pur­
poses. Any identifying information about the client has 
been changed or edited out of the material in order to pro­
tect the client’s identity. It is very unlikely that you 
will ever come into contact with this person. However, 
under no circumstances should you ever discuss the person 




If you have any questions or comments concerning this 
project, please contact me, Ruth Ann Mertens, about this 
matter. My name and telephone number are listed at the bottom 
of these instructions. You are to tear them off and retain 
them for future reference.
Your responses in this study will be kept completely 
confidential and will not be associated with your name.
If, when the tape is played, you recognize the client, 
please notify me immediately and the tape will be stopped.
If you have read this statement and fully understand and 
agree to the instructions, you are asked to date and sign 
this statement. If you do not understand or completely agree 






Tear off here and retain.
Clinical Judgment Study I
Experimenter; Ruth Ann Mertens, Counseling Psychology Program 
College of Education, University of Oklahoma
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Home Address: 2420 N.W. 45th, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma 73112 
Home Phone : 842-3119
Additional sources of information:
Mark Elder
Office of Research Administration 
Buchanan Hall, Room 314 
University of Oklahoma 
Norman, Oklahoma 73019 
(.405) 325-4757
Robert Ragland, Ph.D.
College of Education 
Room 308
University of Oklahoma 









At this time, I would, like for you to describe the client 
about whom you were given information in the way you think is 
most typical of her on each of the characteristics below.
For each characteristic listed below, place an X by the 
statement which you feel generally describes the client best 
on that particular characteristic. Do not try to mark the 
items in the same way you believe the client marked them 
about herself. Do not use the checklist to describe yourself. 
Try only to describe the client most accurately as you believe 
she really is.
1. From what you know about the client, how depressed a 
person do you think she is?
Very depressed '________________________
Depressed '
Slightly depressed ' __
Not very depressed ' -
Not at all depressed ' ' '
2. From what you know about the client, how withdrawn a 
person do you think she is?
Very withdrawn    ' ' ' ' ' '
Withdrawn '
Slightly withdrawn ' ' ' '
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Not very withdrawn '''' ........
Not at all withdrawn ■
3. From what you know about the client, how expressive of 
feelings and emotions do you think she is?
Very expressive '''' ........
Expressive ''''
Slightly expressive ’ ' ' '
Not very expressive ' '
Not at all expressive ' ' ' '
4. From what you know about the client, how anxious a 
person do you think she is?
Very anxious '' '............ ........
Anxious ''''
Slightly anxious ' ' ' '
Not very anxious '''
Not at all anxious ''''
5. From what you know about the client, how controlling of 
others do you think she is?
Very controlling ' ' ' ........
Controlling '''
Slightly controlling ''''
Not very controlling ''''
Not at all controlling ''''
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6. From what you know about the client, how much do you
think she needs the approval of others?
Needs approval very much ''''....... ........
Needs approval ''''
Needs approval slightly ''''
Doesn't need approval much ''''
Doesn't need approval at all ''''
7. From what you know about the client, how angry a person 
do you think she is?
Very angry '' ' • ......
Angry ''''
Slightly angry '''
Not very angry ''''
Not at all angry ''''
8. From what you know about the client, how much do you
think she tends to take responsibility for others?
Takes responsibility a great deal '''' ........
Takes responsiblity '
Takes responsibility somewhat ' '
Doesn't take much responsibility ''
Doesn't take responsibility at all
9. From what you know about the client, how generally well- 
adjusted do you think she is?
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Very well-adjusted ' ' ' ' ....... ...... .....
Well-adjusted ''''
Slightly well-adjusted ' ' ' '
Not well-adjusted ' ' ' '
Not at all well-adjusted ' ' ■ ’ ■
10. From what you know about the client, to what extent does
she exhibit disturbed thought processes?
Thought processes very disturbed ''''' ........
Thought processes disturbed ' ''
Thought processes slightly disturbed '
Thought processes not very disturbed '
Thought processes not at all disturbed
11. From what you know about the client, how trusting of 
others do you think she is?
Very trusting '''' ........
Trusting '
Slightly trusting ''''
Not very trusting '
Not at all trusting ■
12. From what you know about the client, to what extent is 
she characterized by dependency needs?
Great dependency needs _____  ___________
Dependency needs '
Slight dependency needs '
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Not many dependency needs '' '
No dependency needs ''
13. From what you know about the client, how stable a person
do you think she is?
Very stable '.......... ......
Stable ' ''
Slightly stable '
Not very stable '
Not at all stable ''
14. From what you know about the client, how rigid a person 
.do you think she is?
Very rigid ' ........
Rigid • ' •
Slightly rigid ''''
Not very rigid ''''
Not at all rigid ''''
15. From what you know about the client, how intelligent a
person do you think she is?
Very intelligent ' ........
Intelligent '
Slightly intelligent '
Not very intelligent ' '
Not at all intelligent ''''
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Now that you have completed the checklist describing the 
client as you believe she really is, please go back and indi­
cate for each characteristic on the checklist how confident 
you are that you marked it to describe the client accurately. 
You will state this confidence estimate in terms of the pro­
bability that your marking of the item accurately describes 
the client as she really is,
This means that your confidence estimates will be made 
on a scale ranging from 20 through 100, but using only the 
even tens (i.e., 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100). Thus, 
if you think the chances of your having marked the item to 
accurately describe the client are 70 out of 100, write 70 in 
the blank to the far right of each item. If you think that 
your chances are 8 out of 10, or 80%, write SO in the blank. 
If you are certain that your marking of an item accurately 
describes the way the client really is, you should write 100. 
If you feel that your marking of an item has no more than a 










Please furnish the following information for demographic/ 
statistical purposes. Note that this information is anonymous, 
!.. Age •
2. Sex: M F
3. Specialty area (clinical psychology, social work, etc.)
4. Degree held (M.A., M.S., Ph.D., etc.)
5. Number of years counseling-psychotherapy experience
6. Approximate number of hours of coursework taken in 
psychological testing ........
7. Approximate number of hours of coursework taken in 
projective techniques ........
8. Number of years experience in psychological testing/ 
evaluation ........
9. Number of years experience with projective techniques
10. Number of years experience with MMPI
11. Number of years experience with WAIS
12. Approximate number of Rorschachs given
13. Approximate number of MMPI’s given _ _
14. Approximate number of WAIS given  ___
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15. Place an X by those tests which you routinely use in
psychological evaluations: Rorschach , WAIS  __,
MMPI  __, TAT  __ , Human Figure Drawings _ _  .
16. Do you now engage, or have you engaged in the last five
years, in psychotherapy as a routine part of your work? 
Yes ' No ' ' ' '
17. Do you now, or have you within the last five years,
done psychological testing/evaluation as a routine part 
of your work? Yes No ' ' ' ' -
18. What is your basic theoretical orientation (psychoanaly­




Trait Rating Instrument 




The client about whom you have been given information 
was asked to describe herself using the following check list. 
Here are the instructions which she was given:
"I would like for you to describe yourself as you 
are right now. Do not describe yourself as you 
would like to be or as you think other people 
would describe you. Do not describe yourself as 
you think you used to be or as you might be in the 
future. Please describe yourself only as you think 
you are at this time.
For each characteristic listed below, place 
an X by the statement which you feel describes you 
best on that particular characteristic.
Do not discuss with me how you are marking 
the characteristics as you mark them. When you 
have finished, turn your paper over and let me 
know you have finished marking it,”
At this time, please mark the check list as you think 
the client about whom you were given information marked it. 
For each characteristic, place an X by the statement which 
you believe the client marked in describing herself. That 
is, using the checklist, try to describe the client as you
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believe she described herself. Do not describe yourself.
Try only to describe the client as you believe she described
herself.
1. Ambitious
Very much like me ' •.............. ........
Like me ' ' ' '
Slightly like me ''''-
Not much like me ' ’ ' ' ■
Not at all like me ''''
2. Independent; self-sufficient
Very much like me ■ ........
Like me ' ' ' '
Slightly like me ''''
Not much like me ■
Not at all like me '''' ■
3. “Energetic
Very much like me ' ' ' ■ ........
Like me '"" ' ■ ■
Slightly like me ''''
Not much like me '
Not at all like me ' ' ’ '
4. Orderly




Slightly like me ' ' ' '
Not much like me ' ' ' '
Not at all like me ''''
5. Socially withdrawing; don’t like to be with others
Very much like me ''''..........................
Like me '' '
Slightly like me ''''
Not much like me ''''
Not at all like me ' ' ' '
6. Not given to display of emotions; usually don’t show 
.feelings
Very much like me ' .......
Like me ' ' ’ '
Slightly like me '
Not much like me ''''
Not at all like me '
7. Suspicious; do not trust others
Very much like me '''' '
Like me ■
Slightly like me ''''
Not much like me '




Very much like me 
Like me
Slightly like me 
Not much like me 
Not at all like me
9. Cheerful; even-tempered 
Very much like me
Like me
Slightly like me 
Not much like me 
Not at all like me
10. Anxious; fearful 
Very much like me 
Like me
Slightly like me 
Not much like me 
Not at all like me
11. Non-conforming 
Very much like me 
Like me
Slightly like me 
Not much like me 
Not at all like me
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12. Unhealthy; frequently ill 
Very much like me
Like me
Slightly like me 
Not much like me 
Not at all like me
13. Caring ; nurturing 
Very much like me 
Like me
Slightly like me 
Not much like me 
Not at all like me
14. Physically attractive 
Very much like me 
Like me
Slightly like me 
Not much like me 
Not at all like me
15, Often am the one "in charge" 
Very much like me '' '
Like me '''
Slightly like me '
Not much like me ''''
Not at all like me '''
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Now that you have completed the checklist as you believe 
the client completed it, please go back and indicate for each 
characteristic on the checklist how confident you are that 
you marked it in the same way that the client did. You will 
state this confidence estimate in terms of the probability 
that your marking of the item is the same as that of the 
client.
This means that your confidence estimates will be made 
on a scale ranging from 20 through 100, but using only the 
even tens (i.e., 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100). Thus, 
if you think the chances of your having market the item the 
same as the client marked it are 70 out of 100, write 70 in 
the blank to the far right of each item. If you think that 
your chances are 8 out of 10, or 80%, write 80 in the blank. 
If you are certain that your marking of an item is the same 
as the way the client marked it, you should write 100. If 
you feel that your marking of an item has no more than a 
random chance of being the same as the client marked it, you 




Trait Rating Instrument 




I would like for you to describe yourself as you are 
right now. Do not describe yourself as you would like to be 
or as you think other people would describe you. Do not 
describe yourself as you think you used to be or as you 
might be in the future. Please describe yourself only as 
you think you are at this time.
For each characteristic listed below, place an X by the 
statement which you feel describes you best on that particu­
lar characteristic.
Do not discuss with me how you are marking the charac­
teristics as you mark them. Let me know when you have 
finished,
1. Ambitions
Very much like me ''''
Like me ''''
Slightly like me ''''
Not much like me '''' .
Not at all like me ''''
2. Independent; self-sufficient 
Very much like me '''
Like me ''''
Slightly like me ''''
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Not much like me ''''
Not at all like me ''''
3. Energetic
Very much like me ''''
Like me ''''
Slightly like me ''''
Not much like me '''''
Not at all like me ''''
4. Orderly
Very much like me ''''__
.Like me ■
Slightly like me ''''
Not much like me ''''
Not at all like me ''''
5. Socially withdrawing; don't like to be with others 
Very much like me ''''
Like me ''''
Slightly like me ''''
Not much like me ■
Not at all like me ''''
6. Not given to display of emotions; usually don't show 
feelings
Very much like me '''' -
Like me ' ' ’ ' '
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Slightly like me ''''
Not much like me ''''
Not at all like me ''''
7. Suspicious; do not trust others
Very much like me ''''
Like me ' ' ' ' ■
Slightly like me ''''
Not much like me ' ' ' '
Not at all like me ' ' ' '
8. Intelligent
Very much like me ''''
Like me ■
Slightly like me ' ' ' '
Not much like me ''''
Not at all like me ''''
9. Cheerful; even-tempered
Very much like me ■
Like me ' ' ' ■ ■
Slightly like me ■
Not much like me ''''
Not at all like me ''''
10. Anxious; fearful




Slightly like me 
Not much like me 
Not at all like me
11, Non-conforming 
Very much like me 
Like me
Slightly like me 
Not much like me 
Not at all like me
12, Unhealthy; frequently ill 
Very much like me
Like me
Slightly like me 
Not much like me 
Not at all like me
13. Caring; nurturing 
Very much like me 
Like me
Slightly like me 
Not much like me 
Not at all like me
14. Physically attractive 




Slightly like me 
Not much like me 
Not at all like me
15. Often am the one "in charge”
Very much like me '
Like me ''''
Slightly like me ''''
Not much like me ''''









You will be asked to make some clinical judgments about 
a client. This client is a twenty-one (21)-year-old female. 
She is a student at a state university in the field of com­
puter science. She is being seen as a client at the counsel­









Please answer the following questions about the client. 
For the first two questions, place an X above one of the five 
statements on the scale which best answers the question. For 
the third question, write out your diagnosis of the client.
(1) How well did you like the client as a person?
Very Fairly Slightly Not Very Not at
Much Well Much All
(2) How much like you was the client"
Very Quite a Bit Somewhat Not Much Not at All
Much Like Me Like Me Like Me Like Me
Like Me








Subjects: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accuracy Score - Predictive Task
19 20 19 20 18 18 18 20 14 21
Accuracy Score - Evaluative Task
14 17 12 14 17 15 13 17 14 16
Confidence Score - Predictive Task
84 67 47 56 71 55 71 71 27 50
Confidence Score - Evaluative Task
95 61 58 41 82 47 77 73 21 61
Assumed Similarity Score
11 19 20 12 23 17 14 9 14 16
Real Similarity Score




Subjects: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accuracy Score - Predictive Task
21 21 17 20 19 24 20 17 24 14
Accuracy Score - Evaluative Task
15 12 14 14 9 8 13 16 15 5
Confidence Score - Predictive Task
63 65 62 59 73 33 30 90 60 54
Confidence Score - Evaluative Task
55 85 79 80 82 35 27 94 66 63
Assumed Similarity Score
20 24 26 25 22 19 35 25 32 18
Real Similarity Score
24 18 23 18 21 21 29 28 24 18
Effects of Information
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Stereotype-Video-Di agnost ics Group
Subjects; 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 W
Accuracy Score - Predictive Task
21 22 16 16 21 19 14 18 22 16
Accuracy Score - Evaluative Task
15 13 12 12 19 15 16 11 25 12
Confidence Score - Predictive Task
61 55 78 59 83 65 66 69 72 47
Confidence Score - Evaluative Task
82 72 93 68 97 80 65 83 87 81
Assumed Similarity Score
23 22 17 17 30 20 22 19 24 19
Real Similarity Score
20 22 19 17 21 19 22 21 22 23
Effects of Information
176
Likability of Client 
Rating on Five-Point Scale
Subjects; 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Stereotype
Group 5 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 4  4
Stereotype-
Video

















Similarity to Client 
Rating on Five-Point Scale
1 2  3 4 5 6 2 8 9
3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3  2
3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3  2
2 4 3 3 1 3 2 2 4  3
